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INTRODUCTION
FOR decades, courts and commentators have debated the relationship
between discrimination against a protected group and evidence that
members of that group are disproportionately excluded from an opportu-
nity or benefit.1 For example, would distinguishing between job candi-
dates on the basis of a standardized test that excludes substantially more
African-Americans than other racial groups be probative of discrimina-
tion because of race?2 Would distinguishing between candidates on the
basis of height, resulting in the exclusion of substantially more women or
Asians than men or other ethnic groups, be probative of discrimination
because of sex or national origin?3
Few would argue that proof of disproportionate impact is irrelevant to
the issue of discrimination; exactly how it relates, however, is more con-
troversial.4 The relationship depends on the theory of discrimination.5
Indeed, the relevance of disparate impact evidence, like any evidence,
depends on what it is being offered to establish.6 But there is no consen-
1. Writing in 1976, Professor Brest stated:
Of the civil rights issues that have emerged during the past decade, two of the
most controversial and important involve the propriety of granting racial pref-
erences to traditionally disadvantaged minorities and the operational relevance
of the fact that a color-blind practice has a disproportionate adverse impact on
the members of a racial minority group. Any attempt to resolve these issues
must begin by examining the rationales for, and parameters of, the antidis-
crimination principle [or other theories to remedy discrimination].
Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1976); see also infra Section I (describing the variety of
theories using evidence of disparate impact to prove illegal discrimination).
2. Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("Disproportionate im-
pact [on black applicants resulting from a civil service exam] is not irrelevant, but is not
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.")
with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("If an employment practice
[such as a general intelligence test] which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown
to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited."). Cf. The Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988) ("No citizen shall be denied the right to
vote ... because of his failure to comply with any test [in a jurisdiction with less than
50% of the persons registered or voting in the presidential election] ... [if] the test...
has been used during the ten years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or
with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.")
3. Under Title VII, "a plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral standards in
question [such as a height minimum] select applicants for hire in a significantly discrimi-
natory pattern", and then "the employer must meet 'the burden of showing that any
given requirement [has] . . . a manifest relationship to the employment in question.' "
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
4. See supra notes 1-3; see also Welch, Superficially Neutral Classifications: Ex-
tending Disparate Impact Theory to Individuals, 63 N.C.L. Rev. 849, 874-75 (1985)
("[T]he use of statistics has become routine in Title VII cases not because the law man-
dates proportional outcomes but because of what disproportionate outcomes tell us about
discriminatory behavior.") (footnote omitted).
5. See supra note 1.
6. See James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 689, 690-91
(1941).
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sus on what constitutes discrimination under the various antidiscrimina-
tion laws.7 That is the crux of the problem.
The current debate over the theory of disparate impact discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 has been raised implicitly
in cases focusing on disputes over particular evidentiary issues.9 Because
these issues have been resolved without explicit articulation of a dispa-
rate impact theory of discrimination, the evidentiary rulings' have led to
inconsistent interpretations of disparate impact doctrine'" under Title
VII.
The debate became more pronounced in the Supreme Court's contro-
versial decision, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 2 which adopted cer-
tain evidentiary standards for disparate impact cases that were
inconsistent with standards adopted over two decades ago in the
landmark decision Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 3 In response, Congress is
considering legislation to reverse Wards Cove and to restore the Griggs
standards.14 Even this recent controversy, however, focuses on resolving
7. See infra Section I.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
9. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. The most explicit discussion of the
theoretical debate occurred in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
Compare id. at 985-91 (plurality) (disparate impact doctrine prohibits facially neutral
practices that operate "functionally equivalent" to intentional discrimination) with id. at
1001-06 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (disparate impact doctrine focuses on the effect of
facially neutral practices, not on the employer's intent). See also Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440, 458-59 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (disparate impact doctrine focuses on ulti-
mate impact on protected group to raise inference of discrimination against individual
group members).
10. See infra Appendix-Summary of Comparison of Evidentiary Issues.
11. See e.g., Cox, Substance and Process in Employment Discrimination Law: One
View of the Swamp, 18 Val. U.L. Rev. 21, 46 (1983) [hereinafter "Cox I"] (suggesting that
the "incoherence [of the Supreme Court's interpretation of disparate impact discrimina-
tion] is traceable to the Court's failure to explain which of a number of plausible but
largely inconsistent functions the [disparate impact] model serves"); Cox, The Future of
the Disparate Impact Theory of Employment Discrimination after Watson Y. Fort Worth
Bank, 1988 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 753, 753 [hereinafter "Cox II"] (analysis of the Watson
Court's split on "the function of the impact model and the structure of litigation under
it"); Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34
Am. U.L. Rev. 799, 826 (1985) ("Judicial attempts to impose limitations on the [disparate
impact] model ... have been ... unconvincing because there is no agreement on the
[model's] underlying theory.").
12. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Compare id at 655-61 (requiring employees both to isolate
cause of disparate impact and to bear burden of persuasion that employer's business ne-
cessity justification was not reasonable) with id at 668-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (al-
lowing employee to prove that one or more of employer's practices caused the disparate
impact and requiring employer to persuade that its use of disparately impacting criterion
was necessary to its business).
13. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs required the employee to prove the disparate impact
of the employer's practices, and required the employer to persuade that its use of dispa-
rately impacting criterion was necessary to its business. See id. at 430-33.
14. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 3-4, 137 Cong.
Rec. H53 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991).
Last session Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1990, a bill that contained identi-
cal language. See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 3-4, 136 Cong. Rec. S9966-67 (daily
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the inconsistencies of disparate impact doctrine at an evidentiary level.
This Article attempts to redirect the discussion of disparate impact
doctrine under Title VII from resolution of discrete evidentiary issues to
debate on the fundamental theoretical split in the doctrine. Only by ac-
knowledging and developing two competing theories of disparate impact
discrimination can the incoherent state of Title VII law be explained and
resolved. 15
The first theory, implicitly espoused in Wards Cove and other recent
Supreme Court decisions,16 would prohibit only discrimination based on
explicit or pretextual use of an individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. This theory would permit an employer to make distinc-
tions based on any facially neutral criteria, including those resulting in
disparate impact on protected groups, unless the employer used those
criteria as a pretext for discrimination based on a prohibited factor. The
theory finds pretextual discrimination only when the employer uses dis-
parately impacting criteria unreasonably. This fault-constrained theory
will be referred to as the "Fault Theory."
The second theory, implicitly espoused in Griggs, other previous
Supreme Court decisions17 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,18 would pro-
hibit not only discrimination based on explicit or pretextual use of one of
the prohibited factors, but also discrimination based on any biased or
non-neutral criteria that an employer uses without business justification.
Distinctions based on facially neutral criteria that result in disparate im-
pact on protected groups would be deemed non-neutral. An employer
would not be permitted to use such a suspect criterion unless its use was
justified by the needs of the business. This effects-focused theory will be
referred to as the "Effects Theory."
ed. July 18, 1990); H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 3-4, 136 Cong. Rec. H6746,
H6769 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990); Conference Report on S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
§§ 3-4, 136 Cong. Rec. S15327 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. H9984 (daily ed.
Oct. 17, 1990). President Bush vetoed the legislation, and the Senate was unable to over-
ride his veto. See 136 Cong. Rec. S16562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
15. Both of these disparate impact theories have been developed within the context of
Title VII. See cases cited infra notes 16-17. The applicability of either theory to contexts
beyond Title VII remains an issue for another day. Cf Maltz, The Expansion of the Role
of the Effects Test in Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Analysis, 59 Neb. L. Rev. 345,
353-62 (1980) (suggesting inappropriateness of expanding the applicability of disparate
impact discrimination theory beyond its original context).
16. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655-61 (1989); Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-98 (1988) (plurality); New York Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-87 & n.31 (1979); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
457-63 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 339-40 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
17. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 668-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Watson, 487 U.S. at
1000-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Teal, 457 U.S. at 448-56; Beazer, 440 U.S. at 598-
602 (White, J., dissenting); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-32; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 246-48 (1976); Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 427-36; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 430-35 (1971).
18. H.R. 1, supra note 14, at §§ 3-4.
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Relying on these theoretical guidelines, the Article develops coherent
evidentiary contours for each theory19 and compares the consequences of
adopting each theory at both a theoretical and an evidentiary level.20
This exercise exposes the substantive choices resulting from the two com-
peting, but now internally consistent, theories.
Comparison of the Fault and the Effects Theories exposes two distinct
visions of equality. Because the Fault Theory allows an employer to use
facially neutral but disparately impacting criteria absent evidence of the
employer's fault, virtually all traditional standards of the workplace will
remain unaltered. Consequently, only those underrepresented groups
who effectively assimilate to the preexisting, facially neutral standards of
a given employer will be employed. By contrast, because the Effects The-
ory prohibits an employer from using disparately impacting selection cri-
teria unless they are justified by the needs of the business, the merits of
many traditional standards of the workplace will be re-evaluated, and
where those standards cannot be justified by the needs of the business,
they will be eliminated. Consequently, those members of under-
represented groups who are different from more traditional members of
the work force, but who can also be productive, will be given employ-
ment opportunities.
The analysis in this Article reveals both the advantages of the Effects
Theory as a tool to advance genuine equality of employment opportunity
as mandated by Title VII2 and the shortcomings of Fault Theory,
which, by requiring employer fault in addition to disparate effects on pro-
tected groups, limits achievement of Title VII's purposes without suffi-
cient justification. 2
I. THE SPECTRUM OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORIES
Courts and commentators have generated a wide variety of theories for
explaining why and under what circumstances disparately impacting pol-
icies constitute unlawful discrimination. Those theories can be divided
into three categories: the narrowest theories, including the Fault Theory,
are concerned with disparate impact as possible evidence of intentional
discrimination; a more moderate group of theories views impact as prob-
lematic when caused by historical discrimination against a protected
group; the most expansive theories, including the Effects Theory, see dis-
parate impact as a harm in itself and may prescribe corrective action on
that basis alone. The contours of the Fault and Effects Theories can be
19. See infra Section IIB; cf Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problem
and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recom-
mendation for Reform, 7 Indus. Rel. L.J. 429, 439-66 (1985) (challenging as "wrong"
evidentiary choices consistent with a distinct theory).
20. See infra Section II.
21. See id
22. See id.
1991]
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further elucidated by situating them within this spectrum of disparate
impact discrimination theories.
A. Intent-Based Theories
1. Discriminatory Purpose Theory
The most restrictive use of disparate impact evidence occurs under the
rubric that demands proof of purposeful discrimination. The key to dis-
criminatory purpose theories is subjective intent to distinguish between
candidates based on their protected status.23 In Personnel Administrator
v. Feeney,24 a Massachusetts law granting absolute preference to military
veterans for state jobs was found not to constitute purposeful gender dis-
crimination. The Supreme Court made this finding notwithstanding that
the state intended to prefer veterans and that the state was aware that
ninety-eight percent of veterans were male and that consequently women
would be excluded from a vast majority of state jobs. Rather, to strike
the law, discriminatory purpose doctrine required that Massachusetts be
shown to have adopted the veteran's preference" 'because of,' not merely
'in spite of,'" its inevitably discriminatory effects.25 Thus, evidence that
the preference resulted in overwhelming and inevitable adverse impact
on women was relevant to, but not dispositive of,26 the issue of gender
discrimination under the discriminatory purpose theory of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.27
In the Title VII context, courts have also narrowly interpreted dis-
criminatory purpose, which is necessary to establish disparate treatment
discrimination. 21 In American Federation of State, County, and Munici-
23. The consequences of finding such purposeful discrimination depend on the law.
Under the Constitution, classifications purposefully based on race would "be subjected to
the strictest scrutiny and are justified by the weightiest of considerations." Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). Under Title VII, purposeful discrimination based on
race or color would be prohibited and purposeful discrimination based on religion, sex, or
national origin would be excused only where those factors are proved to be "a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988).
24. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
25. See id. at 279 (emphasis added).
26. The disparate impact of a practice has been found determinative in extreme cases.
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480-81 (1954) (although substantial numbers
of Mexican-Americans were eligible, none had served on juries in 25 years); Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590-91 (1935) (none of 666 male African-Americans in the popu-
lation had ever served on a jury); cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (overwhelming statistics would establish prima facie case of
disparate treatment under Title VII).
27. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
267-68 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-46 (1976).
28. Disparate treatment discrimination occurs where
[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory mo-
tive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact
of differences in treatment.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
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pal Employees, AFL-CIO v. State of Washington,29 the state paid employ-
ees according to the market value of their jobs despite its awareness that
the policy resulted in a twenty percent undercompensation for jobs held
predominantly by women yet judged by the state's own study to be of
comparable worth. The court ruled that the evidence of this impact, cou-
pled with evidence of historical sex-based wage discrimination and sex
segregation in jobs, was insufficient to establish discriminatory motive.3°
Even where courts draw an inference of discriminatory intent by using
relevant disparate impact evidence, a1 that inference can be rebutted by
showing that, despite the discriminatory effects, the decisionmaker in-
tended to accomplish a facially neutral purpose rather than a discrimina-
tory one.32 Thus, in PersonnelAdministrator v. Feeney,33 the inference of
purposeful discrimination raised by the impact of the veterans preference
system on women did not "ripen into proof" where the legislative history
supported an interpretation of the preference as a legitimate legislative
effort to reward veterans, not to prefer men.' In the face of such an
"innocent" explanation, the inference of discriminatory intent can be
reasserted only by proving that the employer's facially neutral explana-
tion was actually a "pretext" for its discriminatory purpose.35
The most obvious criticisms of this intent requirement are the diffi-
culty of proving subjective intent,36 judicial reluctance to find the defend-
29. 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
30. See id at 1407-08; cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 337-38 (1977) (employees raised inference that employer and union engaged in prac-
tice of purposeful discrimination with evidence of significant underrepresentation of
blacks and Hispanics in the workforce coupled with testimony regarding over forty spe-
cific instances of discrimination).
31. To find an inference of discriminatory purpose, courts will evaluate both plain-
tiff's prima facie proof and defendant's challenge to the factual accuracy of that proof.
See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361-362 & n.50.
32. In rare cases, the prima facie proof cannot be explained by any non-discmina-
tory reason. See, eg., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340-42 (1960) (prima facie
case showed 28-sided boundary that eliminated virtually all African-American voters).
33. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
34. See id. at 279 & n.25; see also American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Em-
ployees v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406-08 (9th Cir. 1985) (unequal pay
resulted from paying according to the market, not from preferring men); cf International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 & n.24 (1977) (company's affirma-
tions of good faith failed to rebut prima facie case of disparate treatment).
35. See Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978); Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 331, 337.
36. See Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitu-
tionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 36, 113 0977); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 14041 (1976); Friedman, Redefining Equality,
Discrimination, and Affirmative Action Under Title VII: The Access Principle, 65 Tex. L.
Rev. 41, 57 (1986); Rutherglen, Disparate Impact under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1297, 1309-11 (1987); Segal, Sexual Equality, the Equal
Protection Clause and the ERA, 33 Buffalo L. Rev. 85, 126 (1984); Weinzweig, Discrimi-
natory Impact and Intent Under the Equal Protection Clause: The Supreme Court and the
Mind-Body Problem, 1 Law & Inequality 277, 300, 318-19, 336-38 (1983); Willborn, supra
note 11, at 806-07. But see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
1991]
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ant to be a purposeful discriminator,37 the futility of prohibiting
discriminatory action that can be reinstituted without any change except
for motive3" and the disutility of prohibiting laudable action whose only
fault was adoption for improper reasons.3 9
A more fundamental criticism occurs where discrimination has been
defined to include only purposeful discrimination.4 This narrow prereq-
uisite unduly restricts remediable discrimination to that which is con-
sciously intended.41 But the idea that all conduct is benign, except that
which is consciously intended to harm, contradicts much of what we
know of the dynamics of prejudice and discrimination. Moreover,
although the equal protection clause has been interpreted to encompass
only purposeful discrimination against protected groups, 42 that narrow
view is inconsistent with judicial interpretation of legislation,43 including
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 S. Ct. Rev. 95, 119-24 (1971) (illicit legislative
motive may be established by resort to surrounding circumstances and legislative
history).
37. See Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 83; Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry,
15 San Diego L. Rev. 1163, 1164-65 (1978); Segal, supra note 36, at 127; Shoben, The Use
of Statistics to Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination, 46 Law & Contemp. Probs.
221, 240-41 (1983); Weinzweig, supra note 36, at 319.
38. See Brest, Reflections on Motive Review, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1141, 1144-45
(1978); Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 113; Segal, supra note 36, at 127; Weinzweig, supra
note 36, at 318-19.
39. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Ei-
senberg, supra note 36, at 112. But see Brest, supra note 36, at 127-29 (law is not "good"
if enacted with improper motivation).
40. This is not to say that motive analysis should not be sufficient, just that it should
not be necessary. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
(relying on motive to uncover individual instance of racial discrimination under Title
VII); Weinzweig, supra note 36, at 336-39 (impact, not motive, is crucial factor in deter-
mining discrimination; but motive must be considered); cf Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217 (1971) (refusing to consider motive under Constitution); Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1207 (1970) (motive
inapplicable to disadvantageous distinction model). But see Brest, supra note 36, at 109-
25 (criticizing the Palmer decision).
41. See Brest, supra note 1, at 7-8, 14; Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 81-83, 147; Fried-
man, supra note 36, at 57; Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 319 (1987); Schnapper, Two Categories of
Discriminatory Intent, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 31, 40 n.39 (1982); Segal, supra note
36, at 87, 92, 125; Willborn, supra note 11, at 807.
42. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
43. See, e.g., id. at 248 (making evidence of disparate impact determinative for requir-
ing serious judicial scrutiny when accomplished by "legislative prescription ... such as in
the field of public employment"); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582,
584 (1983) (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. does not
require proof of discriminatory intent); Voting Right Act Amendments of 1982, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b (1988) (prohibiting use of tests based on their effect and regardless of intent in
determining status to vote); Note, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing an Employ-
ment Discrimination Doctrine Into the Fair Housing Act, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 563, 567-69
(1986) (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000f, prohibits facially
neutral but disparately impacting practices, regardless of discriminatory intent); cf
Maltz, supra note 15, at 353-62 (questioning appropriateness of applying disparate impact
analysis beyond Title VII); Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1261 passim
(Vol. 59
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Title VII,4 wherein courts have adopted broader and more sophisticated
models of discrimination than those focused exclusively on conscious dis-
criminatory intent.
2. Fault Theory
Responding to concerns about the discriminatory purpose theories,
some commentators would expand the parameters of intent.4" They
would permit pretextual use of the prohibited factors to be established
inferentially through objective evidence." For example, instead of rely-
ing only on evidence of subjective intent, these commentators would
strengthen the presumption of intent arising from the doctrine of foresee-
able consequences47 and would excuse objectively reasonable decisions
regardless of intent.4" These theories, which rely on objective evidence,
most closely resemble the Fault Theory.
Like other theories requiring intentional discrimination, the Fault
Theory under Title VII is ultimately concerned that the employer avoid
distinctions based on a candidate's race, color, religion, sex or national
(1983) (applying modified disparate impact analysis under Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34).
44. Both the Fault and the Effects Theories encompass broader interpretations of Ti-
tle VII. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
45. Intent can infect decisions not just in the goal chosen, but also in the means se-
lected to achieve that goal. See Schnapper, supra note 41, at 37-40, 51-54. Others would
expand the concept of intent from focusing solely on the decisionmaker's purpose, to
include the decisionmaker's knowledge, recklessness and/or negligence. See, eg., Blum-
rosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment
Discrimination, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 59, 67-68 (1972) (analogizing disparate treatment to
negligence); Shoben, supra note 37, at 232-37 (advocating expansion of intent to include
recklessness from tort law); Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea.: The Tortured
Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 Yale L.J. 111, 121 (1983) (advocating adoption of intent
standards from criminal law). But cf Cox, Equal Work Comparable Worth and Dispa-
rate Treatment An Argument for Narrowly Construing County of Washington v. Gunther,
22 Duq. L. Rev. 65, 113 (1983) (intent for disparate treatment cases narrower than intent
under law of torts).
46. See Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1298-1300, 1309-11, 1345; Vuyanich v. Repub-
lie Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 262-65, 277 (N.D. Tex. 1980); cf Cox I, supra
note 11, at 47, 108-18 (legitimate interpretation of Title VII's impact model as an "ap-
proximat[ion] [of] a disparate treatment model"); Cox II, supra note 11, at 757 (interpre-
tation implying "that the impact theory [under Title VII] is merely an extension of
disparate treatment theory designed to capture pretextual use of race and gender neutral
employment criteria").
47. See Gold, supra note 19, at 588-96; Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 283-84 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Intent under
the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Height Mr. Healthy, and
Williamsburg, 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 725, 752-55 0977); cf Ely, supra note 40, at
1263-65 (motive evaluation, applicable to random choice situations such as jury selec-
tions, includes doctrine of foreseeable consequences).
48. See Gold, supra note 19, at 590-92; Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1320-29; cf
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 343 n.24 ("affirmations of
good faith in making individual selections are insufficient to dispel a prima facie case of
systematic exclusion") (citation omitted).
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origin. Specifically, it focuses on eradicating pretextual use of the prohib-
ited factors.49
Accordingly, evidence of disproportionate effects is necessary, but not
sufficient, to prove disparate impact discrimination." The employee
must also prove that the employer used the criterion unreasonably. The
theory focuses on the employer's objective reasonableness in using a
facially neutral criterion that in fact distinguishes between candidates
based on their protected status.51 Only the unreasonable use of a dispa-
rately impacting criterion-e.g., one used without any business justifica-
tionl2 would establish that the adverse effect actually resulted from
intentional discrimination based on a protected characteristic rather than
from legal distinctions based on a facially neutral factor.
Although these more objectively based intent theories do avoid the dif-
ficulties of determining the decisionmaker's subjective intent, they do so
in a manner that seems to undercut their focus:
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). The plurality in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Scalia), require that the effects of the disparately impacting criterion
"be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination." Id. at 987-91. They would
find functional equivalence "where facially neutral job requirements necessarily operated
to perpetuate the effects of [the employer's] intentional discrimination that occurred
before Title VII was enacted." Id at 987 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 426-28, 431-32 (1971)). They further defined disparate impact discrimination to
encompass the Bank's practice of leaving promotion decisions to the unchecked discre-
tion of lower-level supervisors who may have infected the selections with their discrimi-
natory intent or subconscious prejudices. See id. at 990; see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440, 458-59 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (In cases "involving direct proof of dis-
criminatory intent[,] the plaintiff seeks to establish direct, intentional discrimination ....
In disparate-impact cases, by contrast, the plaintiff seeks to carry his burden of proof by
way of inference-by showing that an employer's selection process results in the rejection
of a disproportionate number of members of a protected group to which he belongs.
From such a showing a fair inference then may be drawn that the rejected applicant, as a
member of that disproportionately excluded group, was himself a victim of that process'
'built-in headwinds.' ") (citation omitted); American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun.
Employees v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The theory is
based in part on the rationale that where a practice is specific and focused we can address
whether it is a pretext for discrimination in light of the employer's explanation for the
practice."); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982)
(disparately impacting criterion may "raise 'an inference that employment decisions are
tainted by intrusion of illegitimate concerns' ") (citation omitted).
50. But see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 678 n.29 (1989) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) ("The Court suggests that the discrepancy in economic opportunities
for white and nonwhite workers does not amount to disparate impact within the meaning
of Title VII unless respondents show that it is 'petitioners' fault.' . . . This statement
distorts the disparate impact theory, in which the critical inquiry is whether an em-
ployer's practices operate to discriminate .... Whether the employer intended such dis-
crimination is irrelevant.").
51. See Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
52. See, e.g., Richardson v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp. 806, 825 (M.D.
Ala. 1989) (invalidating a disparately impacting test that fell "so far below acceptable and
reasonable minimum standards that the test could not be reasonably understood to do
what it purports to do").
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it is hardly a solution to the analytic problem to give the causal terms a
psychological gloss and then "presume" as a matter of law that when-
ever, in the court's judgment, the use of the criteria cannot be justified
on efficiency grounds, the "motivation" of the employer was a racial
one. The bootstrap quality of [this] reasoning is apparent.53
More fundamentally, the Fault Theory allows evidence of a merely "rea-
sonable" purpose to undercut the presumption of discriminatory intent
raised by the disparate impact of a facially neutral criterion.' 4 Given the
traditionally broad interpretations of "reasonableness," few disparately
impacting policies will fail to meet this standard. Consequently,
although the Fault Theory is structurally distinct from subjective intent
theories, in fact only the limited discrimination that is found to be unrea-
sonable or consciously intended will be remedied."
B. Causation Theories
Other theories divorce discrimination from intent.56 They would pro-
hibit facially neutral but disparately impacting classifications proved to
be caused by the prohibited factors, without considering intent. The cau-
sation theories are distinguished by the degree of causal nexus required
between the facially neutral criterion and a prohibited criterion. The
narrowest of these causation theories would prohibit only disparately im-
pacting criteria proved to be caused both in fact and proximately by a
prohibited factor. 7 More expansively, some causation theories would
prohibit criteria proved attributable or causally related to a prohibited
53. Fiss, A Theory ofFair Employment Laws, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 235, 298 (1971); cf
Shoben, supra note 37, at 228-29 ("Because the issue is intent, however, the actual valid-
ity of the device should not control; it is the employer's good faith belief in validity that
should dispel the inference of intent.").
54. Professor Brest recognized this shortcoming of the Fault Theory when he pointed
out that
race-dependent decisions that are rational and purport to be based solely on
legitimate considerations are likely in fact to rest on assumptions of the differen-
tial worth of racial groups or on the related phenomenon of racially selective
sympathy and indifference ... By the phenomenon of racially selective sympa-
thy and indifference I mean the unconscious failure to extend to a minority the
same recognition of humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, given as
a matter of course to one's own group.
Brest, supra note 1, at 7-8; cf Schnapper, supra note 41, at 58-59 (advocating expanded
intent theory because discriminatory purpose theory fails to uncover means discrimina-
tion); Note, supra note 45, at 124 (criticizing discriminatory purpose theory where an
"innocent" purpose, rather than a legitimate purpose, overcomes disparate impact
evidence).
55. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
56. See. eg., Brest, supra note 1, at 5 (Title VII's antidiscrimination provision disfa-
vors any race-dependent decisions and conduct); Fiss, supra note 53, at 298 (fair employ-
ment laws prohibit use of criterion, not intent); Willborn, supra note 11, at 807 (Title VII
prohibits use of criterion, regardless of motive).
57. See Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 57, 62-64. But see Perry, A Brief Comment on
Motivation and Impact, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1173, 1180-81 (1978) (critique of
Eisenberg).
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factor." Finally, some causation theories virtually presume prior dis-
crimination from evidence of disparate impact on historically disadvan-
taged groups.59
Requiring evidence of the causal connection between past discrimina-
tion and its perpetuation today has been criticized because such proof
"strain[s] the judicial system[,] . . . consume[s] scarce resources and
yield[s] unsatisfying results."'  On the other hand, the credibility of the
theory suffers when the relationship between the underlying theory and
the evidence to support it becomes less exacting. Thus, theories premised
on compensating for past discrimination are criticized when someone
other than the past perpetrator is required to provide the remedy6 and
when non-victims of the past discrimination are permitted to recover
based merely on their membership in the group victimized by the past
discrimination. 62 Indeed, as the evidentiary connection between histori-
cal discrimination and the disparate impact becomes more attenuated,
58. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 1, at 5 ("but for" race discrimination); cf. Cox I, supra
note 11, at 46-47, 101-07 (one legitimate interpretation of Title VII's impact model is that
it is a "quasi-compensatory" model); Cox II, supra note 11, at 758-59 ("If the theory
[under Title VII] is... confined to those particular criteria that perpetuate past discrimi-
nation... so that some evidence of perpetuation were required, the theory would pursue
distributional goals for the limited purpose of partially redressing past societal discrimi-
nation."). But see Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 93-98 (criticizing Brest's "but for" theory
as unworkable and too far-reaching).
59. See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 45, at 71, 89 ("[tjhe generating principles of
Griggs [are] that discrimination is defined by adverse consequences to minorities as a
group and that the right to be free from such discrimination runs to the benefit of mem-
bers of the group unless the respondent can justify his actions"); Chamallas, Evolving
Conceptions of Equality Under Title VI: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the
Bottom Line Principle, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 305, 369 (1983) (evidence of adverse impact
on traditionally disadvantaged groups justifies redress under Title VII because of "the
legacy of past discrimination"); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Dis-
crimination, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540, 559 n.100 (1977) ("First, the plaintiff must be a
member of a group that has suffered from a history of discrimination and that is still
suffering from that discrimination. Second, there must be government action that dispro-
portionately affects the group. And third, there must be some causal connection between
the history of discrimination and the disproportionate character of the impact. These
prima facie requirements should not be onerous."); Perry, supra note 57, at 1178-81 (dis-
parately impacting laws or policies must be subject to "an unusually heavy burden ofjustification... for the simple reason that the disproportionate character of the impact is
not ethically neutral but is a function of prior massive societal discrimination against
blacks"); see also Friedman, supra note 36, at 44 (advocating the access principle to over-
come adverse effects upon disadvantaged group resulting from employer's selection crite-
ria); Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 13 (1979) ("Discrimination
can result from a combination of neutral policies and a tradition of societally imposed
inequity.").
60. Fiss, supra note 36, at 145; accord Perry, supra note 57, at 1180; Segal, supra note
36, at 140; Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 78, 92 (1986).
61. See Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 57-59; Willborn, supra note 11, at 809-10. But see
Sullivan, supra note 60, at 92-96 (commenting that requiring only past wrongdoers to
engage in affirmative action results in "retributive justice" rather than social equality).
62. See Willborn, supra note 11, at 810-11; cf Sullivan, supra note 60, at 95-96 (recog-
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disparate impact theory becomes more focused on effects than causation.
In that instance, the "disadvantageous effect on a disfavored class,"
rather than perpetuated wrongdoing, becomes the cornerstone for judi-
cial scrutiny.63
These "causation" theorists also differ in terms of their goals. Some
would use the presumption of discrimination to require the government
or, in the Title VII context, the employer to prove that its policy does
"not exacerbate the effects of prior discrimination any more than is rea-
sonably necessary to achieve the governmental [or employment] objec-
tive."' Others would additionally allow the presumption to justify equal
achievement, or more proportional distribution of jobs, to compensate
for the prior discrimination.65 Steering a middle course, one author
would not excuse disparately impacting criteria even when justified by
business necessity, nor would he remedy the disparate impact through
group advancement. Instead he would require that in all disparate im-
pact cases employers take affirmative measures--such as training, coun-
seling or education-to overcome the criteria's negative impact on the
protected group.66
Criticism has been most vocal on this point-whether historically
caused discrimination can justify affirmative remedial measures for mem-
bers of previously harmed groups. Indeed, resentment against "quota"
selections has fueled recent efforts to restrict theories of disparate impact
to intentional discrimination.67 These critics argue that allowing prefer-
ential treatment of disparately impacted groups goes beyond antidis-
nizing compensatory theory of affirmative action to raise "protests about windfalls to
nonvictims and injustice to innocents").
63. See Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democ-
racy, Distrust and Deconstruction, 73 Geo. LJ. 89, 90, 118 0984); infra Section IC.
64. Perry, supra note 59, at 561; see also Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate
Effects Standard of Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 555, 575, 577
(1985) (purpose of effects theory is to promote productive efficiency in order to redistrib-
ute the employment opportunities, rather than employment itself).
Responding to the same motivations as the causation theorists, one author advocates
disallowing decisions based on equally unethical foundations as the prohibited factors, i.e.
factors deemed the functional equivalent of the prohibited factors. See Fiss, supra note
53, at 241-43, 296, 299. Under that theory, even facially neutral factors would be prohib-
ited if they result in a disparate impact on protected groups and if the factor is also both
an inaccurate predictor of productivity and beyond the control of the individuals to
whom it is applied. See id at 299. He would include those denied opportunities due to
past discrimination among those deemed to lack control. Thus, African-Americans de-
nied access to decent educations would be deemed to lack control for their inability to
pass standardized tests. See id at 302-04.
65. See Blumrosen, supra note 45, at 89, 103; see also Chamallas, supra note 59, at
316-17, 344, 366 (allowing equal achievement gives more flexibility to employer and more
quickly achieves a balanced workforce).
66. See Friedman, supra note 36, at 63-64.
67. See United States Department of Justice, Report to the Attorney General Redefin-
ing Discrimination. Disparate Impact and the Institutionalization of Affirmative Action
76-86 (1987); infra notes 370-376 and accompanying text.
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crimination principles to principles of redistributive justice.6 Finally,
many question whether providing even compensatory preferential treat-
ment to members of previously harmed groups results in negative effects,
such as stigma and backlash.69
Debate over disparate impact theory has polarized between the intent-
based theories, which are criticized for being too narrow to eradicate sub-
tle forms of discrimination, and the causation theories, which are criti-
cized as forms of unfair preference for particular social groups. In this
debate, the effects-based theories are frequently subsumed, with the cau-
sation theories, into the broad category of affirmative action. This mis-
conception has obscured important differences between the two latter
groups of theories and has muddied the debate about disparate impact
discrimination.
C. Effects-Based Theories
The most expansive disparate impact theories hold that disparate ef-
fects alone should be sufficient to compel judicial scrutiny. 70 They rely
strictly on evidence of disparate impact to identify suspect selection crite-
ria and argue that such evidence is presumptively sufficient to demon-
strate that facially neutral practices are actually biased against the
underrepresented group-and in favor of the preferred group-and
should be prohibited absent justification.71 These theories seek to ensure
68. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 1, at 48-52 (blurring compensatory and redistributive
goals); Ely, supra note 40, at 1255-61 (proportionality at heart of pure impact tests); Fiss,
supra note 53, at 297 ("even if the aim of fair employment laws be redistribution, clearly
this redistributive goal is not to be pursued without restraint"); infra note 85 (describing
alternative theories not based on antidiscrimination principles).
69. See, e.g., Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 Harv. L.
Rev. 947, 958-59 (1982) (preferential treatment programs are condescending to their ben-
eficiaries); Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67
Calif. L. Rev. 3, 8 (1979) (group-based right keeps "minority applicants in a cloud of
suspected incompetency"); Chamalas, supra note 59, at 309 (affirmative action creates a
divisive influence in the workplace); Friedman, supra note 36, at 99 ("Strict racial propor-
tionality... may produce increased racialism, stigmatization[,] ... hostility towards the
preferred by those not preferred, injury to the self-esteem[,] ... and a national sense of
society's decreased commitment to individual improvement, autonomy, and
responsibility.").
70. These theories are analogous to strict liability theories because the effects them-
selves result in a finding of discrimination, regardless of fault. See Blumrosen, supra note
45, at 67; Shoben, supra note 37, at 231 & n.60; Taub & Williams, Will Equality Require
More than Assimilation, Accommodation or Separation from the Existing Social Struc-
ture?, 37 Rutgers L. Rev./Civ. Rts. Devs. 825, 837 (1985); see also supra note 59 (causa-
tion theories focusing on effects). They are distinguishable from strict liability theories,
however, in that the consequence of a finding of discrimination is judicial scrutiny, not
liability.
71. For example, see Bartholet, supra note 69, at 958-59; Freeman, Legitimizing Ra-
cial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049, 1075 (1978); Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects
of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 Tex.
L. Rev. 1, 39 (1977); Shoben, supra note 37, at 238; Taub & Williams, supra note 70, at
836-38; Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treat-
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neutral process and, as a byproduct, more proportional representation. 2
The Effects Theory most closely resembles these theories.7"
The Effects Theory would require that employers use not just facially
neutral, but actually neutral selection criteria in order to ensure equal
employment opportunity.7 4 Thus, an employer's use of a facially neutral
criterion that results in disparate impact on a protected group is both
necessary and sufficient to establish a suspect practice.7 5 The theory fo-
cuses on the consequences of an employer's selection practice, rather
than the employer's state of mind or the historical cause of the
disparity. 6
Under the Effects Theory, an employer's justification for a criterion
serves not to rebut the disparate impact of the criterion, but rather to
limit liability for its use.77 Thus, an employer could use a biased criterion
ment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325, 331-32 0984-85); cf. Vuyanich v.
Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 265 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (impact substi-
tutes for more direct evidence of equal treatment); Cox II, supra note 11, at 759 ("To the
extent that an employment selection criterion fails to measure talents or capacities rele-
vant to job performance, its use may be said to be incompatible with an objective (under
Title VII] of distributing employment by reference to merit."); Willborn, supra note 11,
at 801, 826-28 (impact based on prohibited factors and not justified by business necessity
defense under Title VII reflect market imperfections that encourage employers to use
insufficiently accurate proxies to evaluate productivity potential).
72. Equal achievement might be a byproduct of the theory, but is not a necessary
result. See Caldwell, supra note 64, at 577-78. But see Belton, Discrimination and Af-
firmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L
Rev. 531, 552 (1981) (Griggs authorizes use of race-conscious affirmative action pro-
grams); Cox II, supra note 11, at 797 (envisioning theory of presumed bias from dispari-
ties as "a legal engine for ensuring proportional distribution of employment"); cf supra
note 65 and accompanying text (proportional representation achieved through presump-
tion of discrimination).
73. The Effects Theory discussed in this Article was most influenced by the theory
articulated by Professors Taub and Williams. See Taub & Williams, supra note 70, at
836-38; Taub, Book Review, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1686, 1691-95 (1980) (reviewing C.
MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination
(1979)); Williams, supra note 71, at 331-32.
74. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("Congress has now
provided that tests or criteria for employment or promotion may not provide equality of
opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On
the contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and condition of the job-seeker
be taken into account. It has-to resort again to the fable-provided that the vessel in
which the milk is proffered be one all seekers can use.").
75. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 678 n.29 (1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (for disparate impact discrimination, "critical inquiry is whether an em-
ployer's practices operate to discriminate"); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 1004 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("the disparate impact caused by an
employment practice is directly established by the numerical disparity .. (and absent
business necessity,] this effect itself runs afoul of Title VII.").
76. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 669-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Griggs, 401 U.S. at
432.
77. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 667-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This is similar to the
BFOQ exception under disparate treatment theory. See generally Perry, Balancing Equal
Employment Opportunities with Employers' Legitimate Discretion: The Business Necessity
Response to Disparate Impact Discrimination under Title VII, 12 Indus. Rel. L.J. 1 (1990)
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whenever it is shown to be a business necessity.7" Where such a criterion
can be shown to correlate with differences in productivity, for example, it
can be used despite its non-neutrality. 79 Consequently, the theory pro-
hibits only unnecessary group-based impact.
These effects-based theories are criticized as going beyond the dictates
of antidiscrimination principles. Critics question how discrimination
based on a facially neutral criterion can violate laws against discrimina-
tion based on specified prohibited criteria.80 Such criticism rests on a
narrow interpretation of antidiscrimination laws that is inconsistent with
their remedial purposes. The effects-based theories are also criticized as
"lack[ing] meaningful limits."8" At the same time, they are criticized as
being insufficiently responsive to unlawful discrimination82 because they
focus on too limited a context83 and rely on the status quo for
(advocating use of BFOQ in disparate treatment theory as model for business necessity in
disparate impact theory).
78. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 1002-05 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) ("Nothing in the Act precludes the use of
testing or measuring procedures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden
is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a
reasonable measure of job performance.").
79. See M. Zimmer, C. Sullivan & R. Richards, Cases and Materials on Employment
Discrimination 330 (2d ed. 1988); cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
806 (1973) (distinguishing Griggs because it "dealt with standardized testing devices
which, however neutral on their face, operated to exclude many blacks who were capable
of performing effectively in the desired positions").
80. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976); Rutherglen, supra note 36, at
1299.
81. Taub & Williams, supra note 70, at 841; see Washington, 426 U.S. at 248; Eisen-
berg, supra note 36, at 98; Lawrence, supra note 41, at 320-21; cf Cox I, supra note 11, at
52, 81 (without limits, the theory becomes transformed into an equal achievement the-
ory).
To accommodate concern that a pure effects theory would be rejected as insufficiently
limited, Professors Taub and Williams would require, as a fallback, that "[at a minimum
... those neutral rules which are traceable to, build on, reproduce or perpetuate the old
notions and hierarchies must be justified by a business necessity." Taub & Williams,
supra note 70, at 841; see also Segal, supra note 36, at 140 (limiting pure effects test under
Equal Rights Amendment to where "impact 'is traceable to and reinforces, or perpetu-
ates, discriminatory patterns similar to those associated with facial discrimination,'"
thereby focusing on the harm caused by the factor rather than the motivation and avoid-
ing the requirement of unravelling "a complex chain of events to show how the disparate
impact was caused") (quoting Equal Rights Amendment. Hearings on H.J. Res. I Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (testimony of Ann Freedman)).
82. See, e.g., Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003, 1032 (1986) (neutral remedies required by antidiscrimination
principle may result in remedies for no one; for example, to avoid discriminating against
women by providing inadequate leave policies, an employer may respond with a no-leave
policy for everyone); cf. Williams, supra note 71, at 374-75 (antidiscrimination gives
courts limited function to be carried further by legislatures).
83. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 82, at 1034 (criticizing disparate impact theory for
challenging only "detrimental effects of a neutral policy" "within an employer's
workforce over a limited time period"); Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way
Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1118, 1165-68 (1986)
(disparate impact doctrine fails to accommodate need to integrate spheres of work and
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justification."
D. Summary
Although other theories rely on substantive notions distinct from the
more limited goal of avoiding discrimination against protected classes, 85
family for all employees); Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme
Court, 92 Yale L.J. 913, 966-67 (1983) (equality requires more profound restructuring
than that required by disparate impact); Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75
Calif. L. Rev. 1279, 1325-27, 1329-32 (1987) (equality theory is limited because it accepts
male-biased structures without requiring complementary female-biased structures).
84. See, Littleton, supra note 83, at 1324-26 & n.240; Note, Toward a Redefinition of
Sexual Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 487, 507-08 (1981); cf Freedman, supra note 83, at
960-61 (recognizing that the Brennan-Marshall approach lacks affirmative theory of sex
equality to allow challenge to rationally based sex distinctions); Taub, supra note 73, at
1693-95 (criticizing disparate impact doctrine for allowing employers to justify exclusion-
ary practices with the male-biased status quo); Taub & Williams, supra note 70, at 843
(justifying exclusionary practices with male-biased structures undercuts equality).
85. Other theorists reject the antidiscrimination principle as not being sufficiently ef-
fective in achieving equality. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 59, at 309 & n. 18, 377 n.334
(citing Eleanor Holmes Norton at the EEOC Commissioners Meeting, Dec. 22, 1977,
Daily Labor Rpt. (BNA) No. 43, at E-I to E-4 (Mar. 3, 1978)); Colker, supra note 82, at
1005, 1012-13; Freedman, supra note 83, at 965-68; Littleton, supra note 83, at 1292-93 &
nn.82 & 86, 1302; Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response
to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 Or. L. Rev. 265, 292 (1984). Thus, some advocate
alternative theories of justice for groups and use evidence of disparate impact to trigger
scrutiny thereunder. See e.g., C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women:
A Case of Sex Discrimination 117, 127 (1979) (advocating "inequality" approach, asking
whether the policy in question integrally contributes to the powerless position of women);
Colker, supra note 82, at 1005 n.7, 1015, 1019-20, 1033 (articulating anti-subordination
principle); Fiss, supra note 36, at 146-48 (advocating a theory of redistribution spawned
out of a concern for the welfare of the group impacted); Lawrence, supra note 41, at 328,
356-61 (challenging practices interpreted to convey "a symbolic message to which the
culture attaches racial significance"); Wildman, supra, at 269, 306 (advocating "par-
ticipatory perspective" ensuring full societal participation). But cf. Brest, supra note 1, at
48-52 (requiring more normative theories than the antidiscrimination principle to support
group-based theories of justice); Cox I, supra note 11, at 46, 100-01, 118 (reading Teal to
discredit disparate impact theory modelled on equal achievement premise); Cox II, supra
note 11, at 758 ("if the theory [under Title VII] is applicable to all criteria that produce
disparities, a general objective of distributional equality is implied"); Ely, supra note 40,
at 1255, 1257-60 (rejecting disparate impact because it affirmatively commands racial
balance); Fiss, supra note 53, at 244-45 (equal achievement requires theory of distributive
justice); Taub, supra note 73, at 1690-93 (evaluating less powerful groups by distinct
standards may backfire into reinforcing less-than-equal status of the protected group).
Others would identify differences between protected groups and either revalue or af-
firmatively accommodate those differences, rather than require non-discrimination based
on them. See e.g., Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. 111. L. Rev. 39, 45-46, 78 (accommo-
date immutable sex differences); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L
Rev. 955, 1008-10 (1984) (accommodation of biological reproductive differences); Lit-
tleton, supra note 83, at 1296-97, 1301 (advocating "equality of acceptance" requiring
pairing of male and female characteristics and revaluing female characteristics); Scales,
Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 Ind. L.J. 375, 435-36 (1980-1981) (accommodate
pregnancy and breastfeeding "to restore to women the opportunity to live a continuous
life, integrated with respect to career and procreation just as are the lives of men"); Note,
supra note 84, at 506-07 (advocating revaluing feminine characteristics). But see Wil-
liams, supra note 71, at 341-43, 365-74 (advocating equality approach rather than special
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both the Fault and the Effects Theories are based on principles of antidis-
crimination, the cornerstone of Title VII. The following examination of
the specific goals and evidentiary contours of these competing antidis-
crimination theories, however, demonstrates that the Effects Theory is
most consistent with Title VII's principles and purposes.
II. COMPARING THE FAULT AND EFFECTS THEORIES
UNDER TITLE VII
A. The Distinct Theories of Discrimination
The concept of equality has been defined to have two distinct mean-
ings: equal treatment-requiring that the selection process treat individ-
uals equally 86 -and equal achievement-requiring that the process result
in equal distribution of rewards or benefits. 87 Both the Effects and the
Fault Theories seek to achieve only the former by ensuring nondiscrimi-
nation within the process, rather than in the outcome of that process.88
The theories fundamentally disagree, however, on what constitutes
equal treatment. Fault Theorists interpret equal treatment to require
that all individuals be judged by the same facially neutral standards. An
employer's use of any standard, except either explicit or pretextual use of
an individual's protected status, 89 would be deemed nondiscriminatory. 90
In contrast, Effects Theorists interpret equal treatment to require that
treatment approach to avoid costs attached to recognizing women's differences); Wil-
liams, The Equality Crisis. Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 Wo-
men's Rts. L. Rep. 175, 196-98 (1982) (same).
Still others endorse theories of distributive or economic justice to require more equal
access to certain fundamentals. See, e.g., Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the
Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 993, 1054 (1989) (advocating study
of "race and class, both white supremacy and capitalism"); D. Bell, Race, Racism and
American Law 661-65 (2d ed. 1980) (recognizing both race and class subordination);
Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in The Politics of Law: A Progres-
sive Critique 110 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) ("The underlying theoretical question is ... the
extent to which anything significant can be done about the concededly unique problem of
racism without paying attention to class structure and the forces that maintain it"); cf
Brest, supra note 1, at 5 ("To adopt the antidiscrimination principle as the exclusive
principle of racial justice surely does not preclude adopting these or other principles con-
cerned with economic justice."); id. at 53 (distinguishing more normative fundamental
interest doctrine from the antidiscrimination principle); Fiss, supra note 36, at 143
(same); Freeman, supra note 71, at 1060-61 (same).
Because these alternatives theories are not based on the antidiscrimination principles
underlying Title VII, they are largely outside the scope of this Article.
86. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 273 (1977) (requiring "equal con-
cern and respect"); Fiss, supra note 53, at 237 (requiring that race be ignored).
87. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, supra note 86, at 273-74 (requiring "same distribution of
goods and opportunities"); Fiss, supra note 53, at 237-38 (looking to "outcome" and
"actual distribution of jobs among racial classes ... [with regard to] both the quantity
and the quality (measured, for example, by pay level and social status) of the jobs").
88. See supra note 72. But cf Blumrosen, supra note 45, at 103-107 (preferring equal
achievement to equal process of validation under causation theory of disparate impact);
Chamallas, supra note 59, at 356, 366-68 (same).
89. The Fault Theorists would demonstrate pretext by establishing that the facially
neutral but disparately impacting factor was used unreasonably. See infra Section liB.
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individuals be judged not just by the same standards, but by standards
that are facially and consequentially neutral with regard to the individu-
als' protected characteristic, 91 unless the standard is required by business
necessity.92 For example, in a society that relegated African-Americans
to inferior educational systems, awarding employment opportunities only
to those passing facially neutral intelligence tests would constitute same
treatment but not neutral treatment.93 The Effects Theory would require
that such tests be limited to situations where business needs required
their use.
1. Legislative Support for Both Theories
Neither Title VII's language nor its legislative history resolves the de-
bate over whether it requires only same treatment or also neutral treat-
ment. The Fault Theorists, who limit the definition of equality to same
treatment, argue that Title VII's antidiscrimination provision, Section
703(a),94 explicitly supports the interpretation that the employer would
not be discriminating against a member of an underrepresented group
"because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"
90. Cf Fiss, supra note 53, at 237 ("equal treatment" requires that "[i]ndividual[s']
... race should be 'ignored', that is, not held against them").
91. The Effects Theorists would demonstrate non-neutrality by showing that the
facially neutral factor results in disparate impact, thus establishing that the factor pre-
ferred one group to the exclusion of another. See infra Section IIB.
92. Cf R Dworkin, supra note 86, at 273-74 ("treatment as an equal" requires
"equal concern and respect").
93. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). Similarly, purpose-
fully restricting employment to white males prior to Title VII and subsequently awarding
employment benefits based on past experience or seniority would be same treatment, but
not neutral treatment. See Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1192-93 (5th
Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d
103, 117 (5th Cir. 1975); Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11 th
Cir. 1984); cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 345, 352-53
(1977) (although seniority system perpetuates past discrimination, it is immunized under
Section 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)). Another example of same but not neutral treat-
ment would be to require employees to be available for work Monday through Saturday,
thus accommodating only the Christian sabbath. See Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., 797
F.2d 129, 134-35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 474 (1986). In such instances, same
treatment is actually unequal treatment. Title VII allows an employer to make such
decisions absent proof (i) of subjective intent to discriminate under the disparate treat-
ment theory, (ii) of objective unreasonableness under the Fault Theory, or (iii) of business
necessity under the Effects Theory.
94. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
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unless the employer overtly or pretextually considered the individual's
protected status.
But the antidiscrimination provision also supports the Effects Theo-
rists' neutral treatment interpretation. Although a distinction based on a
facially neutral criterion appears to discriminate against an individual
because of a characteristic other than a protected one,95 to the extent that
it excludes a disproportionate number of candidates of a protected class,
it can also be said to "discriminate against" individuals because of their
protected status in violation of Title VII. 96 The disproportionate correla-
tion between the individual's group affiliation and the criterion demon-
strates the actual non-neutrality of the merely facially neutral factor.
For example, the use of height as a selection criterion, although facially
neutral, actually results in preference for men to the exclusion of women
because men are on average taller than women. A disproportionate
number of women will be excluded because of a sexual characteristic,
and thus will be discriminated against because of their sex.97
Although Title VII's language accommodates both the same- and neu-
tral-treatment interpretations, Fault Theorists maintain that legislative
history limits Title VII to the same-treatment interpretation. Professor
Gold argues that the 88th Congress, which enacted Title VII, contem-
plated prohibiting only discrimination intentionally based on the prohib-
ited factors themselves. 98 The excessive narrowness of this interpretation
becomes evident, however, when the Act is considered in its entirety.
Title VII expressly exempts from liability employers' use of such neutral
criteria as membership in certain Communist organizations,99 national
security requirements,"°° bona fide systems based on seniority, merit,
95. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
96. Statistical disparate impact extends the prohibition against distinguishing between
candidates based on the characteristics of group membership to distinguishing on the
basis of other characteristics shown to correlate with group membership. See generally
Willborn, supra note 11, at 814-26 (discussing statistical discrimination theory).
97. Unusual females, who are taller, will not be adversely affected by this criterion.
98. See Gold, supra note 19, passim. But cf. Chamallas, supra note 59, at 326-28
(support for equal achievement as well).
99. Section 703(f) of Title VII provides that
the phrase "unlawful employment practice" shall not be deemed to include any
action or measure taken by an employer ... with respect to an individual who is
a member of the Communist Party of the United States or of any other organi-
zation required to register as a Communist-action or Communist-front
organization.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(f) (1988).
100. Section 703(g) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this [title], it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire and employ any
individual for any position, [or] for an employer to discharge any individual
from any position ... if -
(1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises in or upon
which any part of the duties of such position is performed or is to be performed,
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quantity or quality of production or work location,"°1 professionally de-
veloped ability tests102 and veterans preferences adopted pursuant to
law.'° 3 If only overt or pretextual use of the prohibited factors could
lead to employer liability, these provisions, which single out particular
facially neutral selection criteria for protection, would be superfluous.
Moreover, the ninety-second Congress endorsed a more expansive in-
terpretation of Title VII than that advanced by the Fault Theorists when
it approved the Griggs "4 effects-based theory of disparate impact dis-
is subject to any requirement imposed in the interest of the national security of
the United States...; and
(2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that requirement.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g) (1988).
101. Section 703(h) of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this [title], it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensa-
tion, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a
bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different loca-
tions, provided that such diffeerences [sic] are not the result of an intention to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).
To the extent employers use these Section 703(h) factors with an intent to discriminate
based on a protected characteristic, however, Section 703(h) provides no protection. See
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353, 355-56 (1977).
102. Section 703(h) also provides that
[it shall not] be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to
act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that
such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended
or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1989). The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to pro-
tect only job-related professionally developed ability tests. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440, 452 (1982); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 & n.21 (1975);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 & n.10, 435-36 (1971). But cf Ruther-
glen, supra note 36, at 1304-06 (Section 703(h) added to ensure prohibition of pretextual
discrimination).
103. Section 712 of Title VII provides that "[n]othing contained in this [title] shall be
construed to repeal or modify any Federal, State, territorial, or local law creating special
rights or preferences for veterans." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I 1 (1988).
104. The Supreme Court distinguished the discrimination in Griggs from disparate
treatment discrimination by pointing out that "Congress directed the thrust of the [Civil
Rights] Act [of 1964] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the moti-
vation." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. Moreover, the Court found the employer liable for
disparate impact discrimination notwithstanding the lower court's express finding of no
intentional discrimination. See id at 428-29, 436.
In Griggs, the company required a high school diploma and a passing standardized test
score for hire and transfer into its traditionally all-white departments. See id. at 427-28.
Blacks failed both requirements in disproportionately high numbers. See id. at 430 & n.6.
Although the requirements perpetuated the company's pre-Act overt race discrimination
and might have been related to the inferior education resulting from society's intentional
race discrimination in education, the Court focused not on whether plaintiffs were victims
of either the employer's pre-Act race discrimination or society's race discrimination in
education, but rather on whether plaintiffs were victims of the employer's diploma and
test requirements. See id at 430-33. Based only on the disparate effects of these facially
neutral but disparately impacting criteria, the Court required the company to establish
that its purpose for adopting the criteria constituted "a genuine business need" and that it
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crimination during deliberations on the 1972 amendments to Title VII.O°s
That Congress recognized employment discrimination to comprise
" 'systems' and 'effects' rather than simply intentional wrongs."' 0 6
To date, the Supreme Court has not entered this debate over whether
Title VII's legislative history precludes interpretations that go beyond
prohibiting intentional use of protected characteristics as selection crite-
ria. Notably, however, the Court has credited parties' Title VII claims in
several cases 10 7 challenging an employer's use of facially neutral but dis-
parately impacting criteria, beginning in 1971 with Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 108 Moreover, in Connecticut v. Teal"' the Court cited the 1972 leg-
islative history as Congress' endorsement of "the disparate-impact analy-
sis employed by the Court in Griggs."110  Even recent decisions",
espousing the more limited Fault Theory do not reject the Effects Theory
based on a limited interpretation of either Section 703(a) or the legisla-
tive history of the Act.
Section 7030) of Title VII, 112 however, restricts the interpretation of
was "manifest" or "demonstrable" that the criteria did in fact achieve the business pur-
pose. See id. at 431-32. The company failed to establish business necessity because,
although it established a sufficiently important business purpose-predicting successful
job performance-,it failed to prove that the criteria were effective in achieving that pur-
pose. See id. at 431-32 & n.7, 436. The Court, therefore, held the company liable for
disparate impact discrimination, noting that "[n]othing in the Act precludes the use of
testing or measuring procedures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden
is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a
reasonable measure of job performance." Id. at 436.
105. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 447 n.8 (citing S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1971)); Blumrosen, Griggs Was Correctly Decided-A Response to Gold, 8 Indus. Rel.
L.J. 443 passim (1986); Chamallas, supra note 59, at 328-29; Rutherglen, Title VII Class
Actions, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 688, 719 nn. 186-187 (1980); Thompson, The Disparate Impact
Theory: Congressional Intent in 1972-A Response to Gold, 8 Indus. Rel. L.J. 105 passim
(1986). But cf Gold, Reply to Thompson, 8 Indus. Rel. L.J. 117, 119 (1986) (absent
amendment or reenactment of pertinent provisions of Title VII, 1972 legislative history
did not "ratify" disparate impact theory).
106. S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971); see H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2137, 2156-57.
107. See cases cited supra note 17.
108. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
109. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
110. Id. at 447 n.8; accord Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 665-66 &
n.9 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra notes 104-105. See generally Fiss, supra note
53, at 240 (likely that neither statutory language nor legislative history regarding goals of
fair employment statute is decisive).
111. See cases cited supra note 16.
112. Section 7030) of Title VII provides that
[n]othing contained in this [title] shall be interpreted to require any employer
... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of
the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin em-
ployed by any employer.., in comparison with the total number or percentage
of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community
•.. or in the available work force in any community.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988).
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Section 703(a) by providing that preferential treatment of a protected
group is not required when based merely on evidence of disparate impact
in an employer's workforce compared with the population or available
labor force in the community.' 13 Fault Theorists cite this provision to
reject evidentiary standards consistent with the more expansive Effects
Theory." 4 The antipreference provision, however, does not undermine
the Effects Theory's neutral-treatment interpretation. Indeed, the provi-
sion is irrelevant to both theories.
The antipreference provision bars the compelled".. preference for pro-
tected group members based merely on statistical imbalance between the
employer's workforce and the community's labor pool. It does not ad-
dress an employer's use of prohibited factors or non-neutral factors as
selection criteria. Under both theories, the violation is established not by
an abstract imbalance between the employer's workforce and the com-
munity's labor pool, but rather by evidence that the imbalance was
caused by the employer's practice, i.e. either an expressly prohibited or a
disparately impacting criterion." 6 The focus of disparate impact doc-
trine is on an employer's qualifying standards, not the employer's
workforce in the abstract." 7 Nothing in Section 7030) insulates an em-
113. Interpretation of Section 703(a) is also limited by Section 703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e)(1), the bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense to disparate
treatment discrimination, which limits the employer's cost of achieving equal employ-
ment opportunity. Because the business necessity response to disparate impact discrimi-
nation is even more respectful of employer's interests, Section 703(e)(1) would not restrict
the interpretation of Section 703(a) for disparate impact discrimination. Cf Perry, supra
note 77,passim (advocating use of the BFOQ exception as a model for the business neces-
sity response to disparate impact discrimination).
114. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651-53, 659-60 (1989);
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991-95 & n.2, 999-1000 (1988) (plu-
rality); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 463 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment);
Gold, supra note 19, at 457-63; Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1313-16, 1326-27.
115. Cf United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 205-08 (1979) (distinguishing
voluntary affirmative action).
116. See Shoben, supra note 71, at 38-40. The employees must establish that one or
more of the employer's practices caused the imbalance. See infra Section IIB2a.
The disparate treatment theory comes closer to violating the antipreference provision
because evidence of an abstract imbalance between the employer's workforce and the
community labor force does raise an inference of discriminatory purpose that must be
overcome by employer's neutral explanation. Cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334-40 (1977) (unskilled jobs). But cf Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (skilled jobs and legitimate geographi-
cal constraints); Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-51 (applying restrictions to disparate im-
pact case). The requirement of subjective intent, however, insulates disparate treatment
discrimination from violating the antipreference provision. See Atonio v. Wards Cove
Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir.1985), reheard en banc on other grounds, 810
F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987).
117. See, e.g., Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Title VII's
concern with effects promotes "our national goal of eliminating barriers that define eco-
nomic opportunity not by aptitude and ability but by race, color, national origin, and
other traits that are easily identified but utterly irrelevant to one's qualification for a
particular job") (footnote omitted); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
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ployer from liability for erecting discriminatory barriers to employment.
Moreover, Section 7030) restricts the granting of preferential treat-
ment. By contrast, both the Fault and the Effects Theories are concerned
respectively with eliminating preference based on the prohibited factors
themselves l"" or preference based on criteria that prefer one group at the
expense of another.' 19 Thus, both theories focus on equalizing the selec-
tion process 120 by eliminating discriminatory criteria rather than by re-
quiring proportionate selections from that process.' 2 '
In sum, neither the language nor legislative history of Title VII conclu-
sively resolves the theoretical debate between the Fault Theory's same-
treatment interpretation of equality and the Effects Theory's neutral-
treatment interpretation.1 22
(1971) (Title VII's goal "was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and re-
move barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white em-
ployees over other employees"); Rule v. Local 396, Int'l Ass'n. of Bridge, Structural and
Ornamental Ironworkers, 568 F.2d 558, 566 (1977) (accepting Griggs' standards); cf
Chamallas, supra note 59, at 333-34 ("systematic disadvantaging as evidenced by group
adverse impact" does not violate Section 7030)).
118. See supra Section IIA (Fault Theory).
119. See supra Section IIA (Effects Theory).
120. The remedy appropriate for both theories would include enjoining unequal stan-
dards that are based on either the prohibited factors or non-neutral factors. See Wil-
liams, supra note 71, at 364-65. In addition, both theories would remedy discrimination
by making whole those individuals previously judged by the unequal standards. See Sec-
tion 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 417-21 (1975). For example, if there were no other standards, reinstate-
ment would be appropriate. If the employer had other legitimate standards, successful
plaintiffs would be judged according to them. See, e.g., Evans v. City of Evanston, 881
F.2d 382, 386 (7th Cir. 1989) (to receive make-whole relief, plaintiffs must pass new phys-
ical agility test and perform well enough on other measures to show "but for unfair scor-
ing of the 1983 test they would have been hired in 1983"); Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose
Corp., 733 F. Supp. 363, 377-78 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (to demonstrate individual injury
caused by discriminatory practice, each plaintiff must prove that he/she was qualified
under employer's bona fide job qualifications). Individuals discriminated against under
either theory would be entitled, therefore, to evaluation by equal rules, not to propor-
tional selections.
121. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (equal treatment vs. equal achieve-
ment); see also Caldwell, supra note 64, at 570-71 (equal achievement rejected in Section
7030)); Segal, supra note 36, at 130 n.253 (distinguishing affirmative action from neutral
process of disparate impact); Shoben, supra note 71, at 38-40 (disparate impact analysis
creates rebuttable inference of exclusion, not obligation for preferential hiring); cf Fiss,
supra note 53, at 297 (antidiscrimination structure of laws restricts their redistributive
aim). But see Belton, supra note 72, at 552 (allowing race-conscious affirmative action
based on disparate impact alone); cf Chamallas, supra note 59, at 356-57 (affirmative
action appropriate alternative to validation under causation theory); Blumrosen, supra
note 45, at 93, 103-06 (same).
122. If Congress adopts the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the evidentiary decisions reflected
in its language would provide more explicit support for the Effects Theory. See infra
Appendix-Summary of Comparison of Evidentiary Issues. Even that legislation, how-
ever, would not conclusively resolve the debate between the Fault and Effects Theories.
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2. Neutral Treatment Interpretation More Consistent with
Congressional Purpose
Congress enacted Title VII in order to equalize employment opportu-
nities by removing "barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees."' 2 a Although improving employ-
ment opportunities of protected groups might result in a more efficient
economy, this benefit was clearly a by-product of the central aim of im-
proving employment conditions for those previously excluded.' 24
In specified circumstances, however, Congress balanced its primary
commitment to eradicate discrimination against employers' needs to op-
erate their businesses. First, the antipreference provision in Section
703(j) 125 clarifies that Title VII does not require an employer to maintain
proportional representation between its workforce and the relevant labor
pool. As discussed above, however, that provision does not excuse an
employer's creation of imbalance through the use of discriminatory selec-
tion criteria.' 26 Moreover, the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification de-
fense to disparate treatment discrimination in Section 703(e)(1)' 21
excuses discrimination based on religion, sex or national origin where the
employer proves that those criteria are essential to the operation of its
business. 2  The following comparison of the consequences of adopting
each theory's interpretation of equality 29 shows that the Effects Theory's
123. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971); see also United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203 0979) (It was clear to Congress that "'[t]he crux of the
problem [was] to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which...
traditionally [were] closed to them.' ") (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Humphrey)); cf Caldwell, supra note 64, at 575-77 (recognizing Congress' goal and
supporting an effects-focused approach to achieve it); Gold, supra note 19, at 580-84
(recognizing Congress' goal but challenging Griggs' implementation of that goal).
Of course, Title VII broadly prohibits "discrimination against any individual ... be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1988) (emphasis added); see infra notes 184-188.
124. Although Title VII broadly prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individ-
ual's protected status, with certain specified exceptions, Title VII only constrains those
inefficient practices that interfere with employment opportunities of protected groups.
See infra note 183. But cf Gold, supra note 19, at 580-82 (1964 Congress recognized
economic harms from purposeful discrimination).
125. See supra note 112.
126. See supra notes 113-121 and accompanying text.
127. Section 703(e)(1) of Title VII provides that
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ an employee... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1988).
128. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-36 (1977); Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
408 F.2d 228, 232, 234-36 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1969); cf Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472
U.S. 400, 421-22 (1985) (case arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
129. In addition, Section IIB, infra, examines the evidentiary choices dictated by the
two theories and the consequences of those choices.
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neutral-treatment interpretation more fully achieves Congress' remedial
purpose while respecting employers' legitimate discretion to run their
businesses.
The consequence of requiring only the same treatment of all individu-
als rather than consequentially neutral treatment can be illustrated by
the Supreme Court's decisions in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert 130 and
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty. 131 In Gilbert the Court ruled that General
Electric's exclusion of pregnancy from its nonoccupational sickness and
accident benefit plan did not constitute gender discrimination. 132 In
Satty, however, it ruled that the Gas Company's exclusion of pregnancy
from the company's normal disease and disability policy 33 did constitute
gender discrimination. 134
The two decisions are reconcilable only from the same-treatment, but
not from the neutral-treatment, perspective. The exclusion of only one
sex-specific disability-pregnancy-from General Electric's benefit plan,
which covered a multitude of risks including some male-specific risks,
was not deemed discriminatory against women because "'[t]here is no
risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there
is no risk from which women are protected and men are not.' "'13- Hav-
ing determined that both sexes were treated the same, the majority
viewed the women's challenge as demanding special treatment 36 because
"pregnancy-related disabilities constitute[d] an additional risk, unique to
women."' 137 Thus, because women and men were treated the same under
the benefit plan, the exclusion of pregnancy did not constitute sex dis-
crimination. The fact that both sexes were judged on a male standard
was not determinative for the Fault Theorists.
38
In apparent contradiction, the exclusion of pregnancy from Nashville
130. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
131. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
132. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-39.
133. The policy allowed retention of accumulated seniority following disability and
accrual of additional seniority during disability. See Satty, 434 U.S. at 140 & n.3.
134. See id. at 139-40.
Subsequent to these decisions, Congress reversed Gilbert by adopting The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982), which added Section 701(k) to Title
VII and defined sex to include pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions.
135. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976) (quoting Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)).
136. The Court also rejected the claims because women already received comparable
benefits without including pregnancy coverage. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138; see also
Satty, 434 U.S. at 152 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring) ("a fair reading of the evidence in
Gilbert demanded that the total compensation of women in terms of disability-benefit
plans may well have exceeded that of men"); infra Section IIB2d.
137. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139; cf. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70-71
(1986) (employee's religious need accommodated where he did not lose job, but lost pay,
for absence from work caused by religion).
138. See Williams, supra note 71, at 346 ("[Tlhe statute did not create a 'double' stan-
dard. Rather, it made man the standard (whatever disabilities men suffer will be compen-
sated) and measured women against that standard (as long as she is compensated for
anything he is compensated for, she is treated equally).").
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Gas Company's leave policy, which allowed for retention of accumulated
seniority and accrual of additional seniority, was deemed discriminatory
against women. This result was distinguished from Gilbert by character-
izing the exclusion as different treatment of women-not denial of special
treatment-because pregnant women did not receive the same seniority
benefits that accrued to men.' 39 Thus, from the same-treatment perspec-
tive, an employer's use of pregnancy to distinguish between individuals
constitutes discrimination only when it deprives female workers of the
same employment opportunities awarded to and appropriate for male
workers.
The Effects Theorists found the special-treatment/different-treat-
ment" 4 distinction between Gilbert and Satty to be illusory. Indeed,
General Electric's failure to insure women for medical risks arising from
pregnancy, while insuring men for all medical risks including vasecto-
mies and prostatectomies, could also be characterized as different treat-
ment requiring judicial scrutiny. 4' This semantic distinction merely
obscured the discriminatory treatment caused by using the disparately
impacting criterion of pregnancy.
Under the Effects Theory's neutral-treatment approach, the rulings ap-
pear inconsistent. Because pregnancy has an obvious disparate impact
on women, it could not be deemed a neutral criterion in any context. 142
The Effects Theorists challenge the ruling in Gilbert because it is only
from the male perspective, not a gender-neutral perspective, that exclu-
sion of pregnancy from an employee benefit package constitutes same
139. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977) ("We held in Gilbert that
703(a)(1) did not require that greater economic benefits be paid to one sex or the other
'because of their differing roles in the 'scheme of human existence,".... But that hold-
ing does not allow us to read § 703(a)(2) to permit an employer to burden female employ-
ees in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of their
different role.") (citation omitted); id. at 144-45 (distinguishing Gilbert and finding that
the Gilbert challenges to sick and disability leave payments were properly brought under
Section 703(a)(1)).
140. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 147-48, 155, 160 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); id at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Effects Theorists also rejected the Court's benefit/burden and Section 703(a)(1)/
703(a)(2) distinctions. See Satty, 434 U.S. at 154 & n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring); Gilbert,
429 U.S. at 154-55, 158 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 647 (1989) (challenging segregated
dorms and eating as disparately impacting under Section 703(a)(2)); Satty, 434 U.S. at
142-43 (challenging Gas Company's leave policy under Section 703(a)(2)).
141. General Electric's failure to cover pregnancy could also be characterized as a
burden or discrimination that "adversely affects [the woman's] status as an employee"
under Section 703(a)(2). But cf Satty, 434 U.S. at 154 & n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(distinguishing Gilbert as affecting pregnancy, not the pregnant employee). Such an in-
terpretation makes indistinguishable the Gas Company's failure to reinstate past seniority
or to award seniority during the leave because of pregnancy.
142. For example, the context in Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 127, was that pregnancy was the
only risk excluded from the employer's nonoccupational sickness and accident benefit
plan and the context in Satty, 434 U.S. at 138, was that pregnancy was the only disability
excluded from the company's normal disease or disability leave policy.
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treatment. 143 Because they require genuine neutrality, they would find
employers' use of pregnancy in that context to violate Title VII. Consis-
tent with Title VII's antidiscrimination goals, this theory requires more
respect for and equal accommodation of all perspectives, not just the per-
spectives of those in power.144
The same treatment/neutral treatment debate also figured in Lynch v.
Freeman.145 There the majority espoused a neutral-treatment interpreta-
tion of equality and found disparate impact discrimination where the em-
ployer's rule prohibiting the use of indoor toilets caused a
disproportionate number of women to become ill from using the unsani-
tary, outdoor toilets. 146 Using a same-treatment approach, the dissent
would have found no discrimination from the rule, despite its consequent
medical problems for women, because it disagreed "that working condi-
tions for all must be upgraded to some unstated standard before women
can have full access to the workplace."' 147 The Lynch case clearly dem-
onstrates how the Fault Theory would allow women to enter the
workforce only to the extent that they can assimilate to the male-oriented
workplace. Indeed, the court's myopia regarding the non-neutrality of
workforce standards and its hostility to examining the business necessity
of the current arrangements highlight the limitations of the same-treat-
ment interpretation. 141 Only by adopting the Effects Theory's neutral-
treatment interpretation will workplace standards equalize to genuinely
accommodate diverse groups of workers.
The Effects Theory, however, is not insensitive to employers' legiti-
mate interests in workplace productivity. Indeed, all standards found to
prefer one group over others would be examined for their business neces-
sity. The theory would require courts to examine whether those found
"unqualified" under traditional workplace standards are actually unqual-
143. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 151-53, 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 161-62 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
144.
A perspective may go unstated because it is so powerful and pervasive that it
may be presumed without defense; it may also go unstated because it is so un-
known to those in charge that they do not recognize it as a perspective. Pre-
sumptions about whose perspective matters ultimately may be embedded in the
final, typically unstated assumption: when in doubt, the status quo is preferred,
and is indeed presumed natural and free from coercion.
Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 54 (1987); accord Littleton,
supra note 83, at 1328-30 (accommodating equally "gendered complements," such as
service in the military and service as a mother); cf Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 620-21 (1987) (accommodating "innocent" majority workers in affirmative
action plans); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (same).
145. 817 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1987).
146. See id. at 388-89.
147. Id. at 391 (Boggs, J., dissenting); accord id. at 390 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("Sani-
tary napkin dispensers would clearly be a convenience for women only."). The "unstated
standard" sought by the women in Lynch is a neutral standard that could accommodate
both men and women.
148. According to the Fault Theory, Title VII prohibits only the employer's use of the
protected factors themselves.
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ified to do the work. Thus, based on Gilbert, Satty and Lynch, the male-
oriented standards would be re-examined. 14 9 When not justified by the
needs of the business, those male-based standards would be replaced by
androgynous ones.15 Only by prohibiting discrimination based on non-
neutral criteria will individuals who differ from the non-neutral norm'
5
'
be allowed employment opportunities unless their differences are shown
to have consequences inconsistent with the requirements of the business.
Under the Effects Theory, therefore, employees can expect truly equal,
not just formally equal, treatment.'52 Consequently, adopting the neu-
tral-treatment interpretation of equality comports more fully with Title
VII's remedial purposes, without sacrificing employers' interests.
B. The Evidentiary Contours of the Theories
The defining components in any disparate impact case are (i) an em-
ployer's use of a facially neutral criterion (ii) that results in disparate
impact based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin and (iii) that
cannot be justified by business needs. The evidence sufficient to satisfy
these components differs under the Fault and the Effects Theories.
Under the Fault Theory, evidence that an employer's facially neutral
criterion disparately affects a protected group would not by itself demon-
strate that the employer was pretextually treating employees differently
in violation of Title VII. To establish a violation, the theory requires not
only that the employer used a disparately impacting criterion, but that it
did so unreasonably. This requirement-employer fault-dictates evi-
dentiary choices at each stage of the disparate impact discrimination
case.
In contrast, under the Effects Theory, evidence that an employer's
facially neutral criterion causes a disparate impact is sufficient to demon-
strate the non-neutral treatment of employees. Evidentiary choices nec-
essary to prove discrimination, therefore, focus on the impact caused by
any facially neutral criterion-not on the employer's fault. Proof of such
impact, however, does not establish the employer's liability; it merely
mandates judicial scrutiny regarding the business necessity for the crite-
149. Although Gilbert and Satty discussed pregnancy-now also an explicitly pro-
tected factor, see supra note 134-the lessons from the same treatment/neutral treatment
debate are equally applicable to more facially neutral criteria where the adverse effect is
less extreme. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
150. See Taub & Williams, supra note 70, at 837-38; Williams, supra note 71, at 363.
151. See e.g., Finley, supra note 83, at 1154 ("['T]o hide the fact of difference from the
prevailing norm means being treated according to a 'faulty neutrality,' or a standard that,
because it was not created with the difference in mind, advances the dominant group to
the detriment of those who are not, in fact, like it.") (footnote omitted); Minow, supra
note 144, at 32 (suggests analyzing difference as a relational concept-women are differ-
ent from men-rather than an intrinsic concept-women are different in themselves).
152. See Taub & Williams, supra note 70, at 836, 839-40; Williams, supra note 71, at
331, 364-65; cf Brooks, Racial Subordination through Formal Equal Opportunity, 25 San
Diego L. Rev. 881, 893-98 (1988) (challenging formalism of disparate treatment
discrimination).
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rion. At the business necessity stage, the court would evaluate the em-
ployer's business justification for using the criterion.
The following discussion of the competing theories' evidentiary con-
tours reveals how the Fault Theory's requirement of fault unjustifiably
restricts employees' ability to challenge criteria that result in dispropor-
tionate exclusion of protected groups. It further reveals that the Effects
Theory's focus on the criterion's impact and on the employer's business
justification for the criterion more appropriately addresses Title VII's
concerns. In sum, this section provides additional support for preferring
the Effects Theory in Title VII disparate impact cases.
1. The Facially Neutral Criterion
Both theories agree that disparate impact doctrine is limited to chal-
lenging an employer's facially neutral criteria, i.e. criteria that are not
explicitly prohibited by Title VII and that are applied to all candidates
regardless of their protected status. 53 Thus, disparate impact doctrine
has been used to challenge the uniform application of criteria such as
testing or minimum height requirements.' 54 Only the Fault Theory,
however, would limit the type of facially neutral criteria subject to
153. In Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 656 F. Supp. 1461, 1468-69 (N.D. Ind.
1987), aff'd, 840 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1988), the employer's decision to award a wage in-
crease to the predominantly male trades and crafts group, but not the predominantly
female office and clerical group, was not analyzed under disparate impact theory because
the employer did not apply one neutral rule to all employees, but rather treated them
differently based on their employment category. See id. at 1471-72. The decision to treat
the groups differently might raise an inference of disparate treatment: that the reason the
male-dominated jobs got the increase whereas the female dominated jobs did not was
because of sex.
The employer did explain, however, that it decided to treat the trades-and-crafts group
differently from the office-and-clerical group to be consistent with the wage scales for
those jobs in the market. Although the use of the market to distinguish between the
occupational groups for the raise would be a facially neutral practice, there was no evi-
dence that the policy resulted in a disparate impact based on a protected factor in the
case. See id. at 1469-70; see also Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1508 (10th
Cir. 1987) (ad hoc application of facially neutral rule undercuts disparate impact analysis,
but may raise disparate treatment analysis); Yartzoff v. State of Oregon, 745 F.2d 557,
559 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("There was no evidence that the employer ever applied
the subjective criteria to anyone but the plaintiff."); Domingo v. New England Fish Co.,
727 F.2d 1429, 1436 (9th Cir. 1984) (no facially neutral factor where employer recruited
cannery workers from one source and higher paid non-cannery workers from different
source); Fiss, supra note 53, at 291-96 (analyzing non-uniform application of facially neu-
tral standards as intentional discrimination).
154. See generally Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (nepo-
tism, separate hiring channels, rehire preferences, subjective decisions); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (subjective decisions of supervisors); Con-
necticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 (1982) (written examination); New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1979) (no methadone use); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 323-24 (1977) (minimum 120-pound weight and minimum 5 feet 2 inch
height requirements); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 410-411 (1975) (Re-
vised Beta Examination and Wonderlic Personnel Test); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
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challenge.1 55
a. Subjective Criteria
One now-resolved evidentiary dispute 156 was whether facially neutral
but subjective criteria were appropriately subject to disparate impact
challenge. The Effects Theory allows challenge to any of an employer's
selection practices, regardless of their subjectivity. 157 The theory focuses
on whether the employer's criterion, no matter how complicated or un-
clear, results in a disparate impact based on a prohibited factor. Such
impact is sufficient to identify the practice as non-neutral. 58 In that in-
stance, the employer would be required to justify the criterion as neces-
sary for its business.
By contrast, the Fault Theory limits such challenge to objective crite-
ria only, arguing that subjective criteria are insufficiently "well-defined"
to be amenable to disparate impact challenge. 59 Thus, absent a more
"clearly delineated" criterion, employees cannot inferentially prove
pretextual discrimination using the disparate impact rubric, but rather
are limited to proving it directly under the disparate treatment theory. 160
Without such clarity, courts would be unable to determine "whether
those neutral acts are a non-job-related pretext to shield an invidious
judgment."' 16 1
Consequently, the Fault Theory would immunize from judicial scru-
tiny all subjective criteria 62 unless supported by more direct evidence of
U.S. 424, 425-28 (1971) (high school diploma and two professionally prepared aptitude
tests).
Congress exempted from disparate impact challenge certain selection criteria used for
certain purposes. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(f)-(h), 2000e-I 1 (1988); supra notes 99-103.
155. See infra notes 303-304, 306 and accompanying text.
156. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
157. See Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title Vil's Dispa-
rate Impact Theory, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 869, 903-07.
158. See Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1525 (11th Cir. 1985); Bauer v. Bailar, 647
F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (10th Cir. 1981).
159. See Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
160. See id at 708-09; see also Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 1984)
(disparate impact analysis applies primarily to "quantifiable or objectively verifiable selec-
tion criteria which are mechanically applied"); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668
F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1982) (arguing that "the failure to post job openings, the use of a
level system, and evaluating employees with subjective criteria ... are [not] akin to the
'facially neutral employment policies' the disparate impact model was designed to test").
The issue of subjectivity is often related to the issue of isolating the particular facially
neutral criterion causing the impact. See infra Section IIB2a.
161. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708; accord Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 800; Atonio v. Wards
Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Congress was concerned about
mandating color blindness with as little intrusion into the free market system as possi-
ble."), reheard en banc on other grounds, 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987).
162. The distinction between objective and subjective criteria may be less than clear.
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988) ("However one might
distinguish 'subjective' from 'objective' criteria, it is apparent that selection systems that
combine both types would generally have to be considered subjective in nature.").
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the employer's conscious discriminatory intent. This consequence is par-
ticularly troubling because it is precisely the ill-defined nature of subjec-
tive criteria that makes them susceptible to concealing discrimination. ' 63
Thus, to ensure against discrimination, subjective criteria should be scru-
tinized as closely as more well-defined criteria. Only the Effects Theory
requires equal scrutiny of subjective criteria.1"4
Recognizing that employers could effectively undercut disparate im-
pact analysis and insulate themselves from challenge by including subjec-
tive criteria in their selection processes, the Supreme Court unanimously
decided that subjective criteria are as amenable to disparate impact chal-
lenge as objective criteria. 65
b. The Control Element
A second, yet unresolved, evidentiary dispute regarding facially neu-
tral criteria concerns the relevance of employer control over the adoption
of, and employee control over compliance with, the criteria. The Effects
Theory attributes no relevance to either employer or employee control in
disparate impact cases. The Fault Theory, however, allows control to
determine the availability of disparate impact challenge.
Effects Theorists require justification for any disparate impact caused
by a facially neutral criterion, regardless of whether the employer had
control over its use. Thus, the employer would be responsible for the
disparate effects of any of its practices, regardless of fault.
Fault Theorists, however, would exempt from challenge those criteria
over which the employer has no control. This is consistent with their
view that only unreasonable use of a disparately impacting factor violates
Title VII. Thus, an employer would not be at fault for any disparate
impact resulting from a criterion that it felt compelled to use.
Using this rationale, several courts have refused to examine employers'
use of market wage rates to set salaries, despite proof that the market had
a disparate impact based on gender.1 6 6 Without specific proof by any
employer, these courts categorically concluded that all employers are
merely " 'price-takers'" who "deal with the market as a given,' 1 67 even
163. See id. at 1009-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
164. See id. at 1008-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
165. See id. at 989-91 (Kennedy, J., took no part in the case). However, the Court
remained divided along theoretical lines in discussing the evidentiary contours of the
disparate impact discrimination doctrine now made applicable to subjective criteria.
Compare id. at 989-99 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, and Scalia, J.J.)
(advocating evidentiary rulings consistent with Fault Theory) with id. at 1000-10 (Black-
mun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, J.J.) (advocating evidentiary rulings consistent
with Effects Theory). This discussion was dictum because the district court and court of
appeals ruled as a matter of law, without evaluating employee's evidence, that disparate
impact doctrine was inapplicable to claims involving subjective criteria. See id. at 984.
166. See, e.g., Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 708 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 656 F. Supp. 1461, 1469-
70 (N.D. Ind. 1987), aff'd, 840 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1988).
167. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708; cf Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1133
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when the employers were public entities. The employers were deemed
not sufficiently "culpable" to be required to justify their use of the mar-
ket within the context of their particular business. 6 '
In reality, however, the employer has no less discretion over whether
to pay according to the market than over whether to hire according to
customer preferences1 69 or test results. What might distinguish these
standards is not the employer's control, but rather the employer's costs
of not using them. Legitimate business costs, however, are precisely
what the court examines at the business necessity stage of disparate im-
pact cases, after finding a disparately impacting criterion. 7 0
Categorically exempting from judicial scrutiny those criteria that, like
the market, have an admittedly disparate impact undermines Title VII's
remedial nature. When Congress meant to exempt facially neutral fac-
tors from disparate impact challenge, it did so. 7 ' Other than the con-
gressionally authorized exemptions, courts should require employers to
justify their use of disparately impacting criteria, either as reasonable or
necessary, on a case-by-case basis under the standards of business neces-
sity. 172 This expansive interpretation of disparate impact doctrine is
designed not to hold the employer responsible for the market's gender
discrimination, customers' prejudices or inadequate educational systems,
but rather to require that the employer justify using those discriminatory
measures in its business.
Evaluation of the market at the business necessity stage under the Ef-
fects Theory allows the court to judge whether to excuse an employer's
use of the market criterion, despite its impact on women, based on con-
sideration of the business costs to the employer of eliminating use of the
criterion. 173 This is consistent with Title VII's aim of accounting for em-
ployer needs when considering whether to prohibit a particular practice.
Evaluating the market during the prima facie case under the Fault The-
ory, on the other hand, requires the court to protect an employer's use of
the market based solely on concerns regarding the employer's fault in
adopting the criterion. By requiring the determination during the prima
facie case, the employer is not even required to explain why it adopted
(7th Cir. 1983) ("no showing that the assignment and compensation policy was dictated
by the federal government"); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana,
410 F. Supp. 873, 897 (C.D. Calif. 1976) (city not responsible for hiring from entire
county rather than from city if it could "demonstrate that economic forces beyond...
[its] control dictated that... [the county] would provide the bulk of applicants").
168. See Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708.
169. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1971);
Willborn, supra note 11, at 832.
170. See infra Section IIB3.
171. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(f)-(h), 2000e-1 1 (1988); supra notes 99-103.
172. See infra Section IIB3; cf Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 656 F. Supp. 1461,
1469-70 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (finding reliance on the market inappropriate and unworkable
in disparate impact analysis), aff'd, 840 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1988).
173. See infra Section IIB3.
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the criterion.174 Not only does this judgment fail to account for the ex-
clusionary effect of the criterion, it also requires the court to exonerate an
employer's use of a non-neutral criterion on the more amorphous basis of
fault rather than on the more objective and congressionally recognized
ground of business need. Thus, it is more consistent with Title VII's
policies to adopt the Effects Theory's approach of evaluating the merits
of all disparately impacting criteria, even those involving high business
costs, at the business necessity stage.
The debate over the relevance of control in disparate impact doctrine
also focuses on the employee's discretion over whether to comply with
the employer's standard. Effects Theorists would require employer justi-
fication for the criterion, regardless of employee control. Thus, employ-
ees would be compelled to comply with the employer's disparately
impacting standards only when justified by the needs of the business.
Fault Theorists, on the other hand, would exempt from challenge
those factors over which the employee has control. 75 They would re-
quire an employer to explain its use of an impacting factor only when
employees are unable, not just unwilling, to comply. Where the employ-
ees are able to comply, it is their discretion, not their protected status,
that results in their exclusion.
Citing employee control, courts have upheld English-only rules appli-
cable to bilingual employees 176 as well as grooming requirements, such as
hair length and style. 177 Thus, without any evidence of even a rational
business purpose for imposing the rule, Fault Theorists would uphold the
employer's discretion to compel employee compliance with standards
employees are able to meet, even when they result in a disparate impact.
What the Fault Theory fails to account for, however, is the cost to the
employee of complying with the employer's facially neutral rule.'78 In-
174. See infra note 322.
175. This concern for employee control is reminiscent of the causation theorists' focus
on the cause of the disparity. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text; cf Fiss,
supra note 53, at 299 (requiring lack of employee control in addition to lack of productiv-
ity for criterion to be deemed "functional equivalent" of prohibited factor).
176. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981).
177. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir.
1975); cf Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1981) (evi-
dence of disparate impact caused by exam challenged on basis of evidence that employees
failed to study for exam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982). But cf Richardson v. La-
mar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp. 806, 815-16 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (crediting impact
data on the pass/fail rates of blacks and whites taking the test for first time, while re-
jecting data on pass rates that included candidates passing the test after multiple retakes).
178. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 1988) (rec-
ognizing hardship imposed by English-only rule, court found such rules to be subject to
disparate impact theory), vac. as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d
380, 386 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding that company's "outside toilet" policy disparately im-
pacted against women despite employer's argument that women could have avoided the
impact by taking such affirmative steps as carrying their own toilet paper, carrying find
using toilet seat covers or refraining from sitting on the toilets, pursuing better compli-
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deed, courts have enforced such employment requirements despite their
socio-cultural association. 7 9 For example, no-beard policies have been
enforced in spite of racially linked medical problems 80 or religious prac-
tices 8' that prohibit the employee from shaving. Thus, adoption of the
Fault Theory may result in insensitivity to precisely those racial, ethnic
or religious based hardships'82 Title VII was enacted to redress.
By examining all of an employer's disparately impacting criteria, re-
gardless of employer/employee control, the Effects Theory focuses on the
employer's business need for the criterion, rather than the more variable
and complex issues of either the employer's "fault" or the employee's
"innocence." Moreover, the Effects Theory will require employees to as-
similate to standards of the preferred group only when necessitated by
the particular needs of the employer's business, not merely to accommo-
date a power struggle between the employer and the employee.
ance with toilet service contract and checking out the waterless hand cleaner); Willing-
ham, 507 F.2d at 1087 (enforcing hair-length policy for men in 1970 to disassociate
business from "counter-culture types"); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 676 (8th
Cir. 1974) (employer unsuccessfully sought to avoid judicial scrutiny of its no-garnish-
ment policy by arguing that garnishment resulted from employee's voluntary conduct);
Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 Harv. Women's
L.J 73, 118-19 (1982) (recognizing clothing as expression of image, particularly for wo-
men in patriarchal society); cf Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602, 1606 (1990) (employee who lost job for ingesting peyote for sacra-
mental purposes at Native American Church denied unemployment benefits); Ansonia
Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68, 70 0986) (employee denied use of personal
business leave day for mandatory religious observance because employee was fully ac-
commodated where he was given day off, even if it was without pay); United States v.
Board of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 891 (3d Cir. 1990) (undue hardship for school district to
disobey state criminal statute forbidding religious attire in classrooms by allowing devout
Muslim right to wear religious attire in classroom).
179. See e.g., Garcia, 618 F.2d at 266-67 (English-only rule upheld despite testimony
that, "because Spanish is his primary language, he found the English-only rule difficult to
follow," and despite recognition of the importance of Spanish to the "ethnic identification
for Mexican-Americans"); Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (enforcing prohibition of all-braid hairstyle, regardless of its significance
for Black American women); Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) r
32,012, at 21,555 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (same); Wofford v. Safeway Stores, 78 F.R.D. 460, 469
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (employer may require employees to be clean shaven). See generally
Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. Rev. 303
(1986) (discussing tension between a singular "American" identity and Constitutional tol-
erance for cultural diversity).
180. See EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980); Bradley v. Pizzaco of
Neb., Inc., 51 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) f1 39,355, at 59,450-51 (D. Neb. 1989), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,565 (8th Cir. 1991).
181. See Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1984). In
Bhatia, a new statutory requirement of gas-tight face seal for safety equipment impacted
those with facial hair, including those observing Sikh religion. See id.
182. Cf Fiss, supra note 53, at 302 (recognizing past racial discrimination as impedi-
ment to individual control); Minow, supra note 144, at 50-54 (sensitivity enhanced by
ability to see from another's perspective).
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2. Proving Disproportionate Impact
Whichever facially neutral criteria are subject to scrutiny, disparate
impact doctrine requires proof that the criteria distinguish between can-
didates based on one of the prohibited characteristics.I 3 Although Con-
gress had particular concern with "the plight of the Negro in our
economy," 18 4 the antidiscrimination provision of Title VII indicates Con-
gress' intent to remove barriers based on any individual's protected sta-
tus.18 5  Consequently, all groups, even Euro-American males, are
protected.1 8 6 Under both theories, it is the employer's use of discrimina-
tory criteria--either the prohibited factors themselves or non-neutral fac-
tors-that necessitates judicial scrutiny, not harm to any particular
group."8 7 Accordingly, an employer's process will be viewed as discrimi-
183. By its language, Title VII constrains employers from discriminating in employ-
ment only "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
Absent a contract or a statute, an employer had unlimited discretion to award or with-
hold employment opportunities at will: for good reason, bad reason or no reason. See
generally Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 563-67 nn.l-5, 335 N.W.2d
834, 835-37 nn.l-5 (1983) (discussing the employment-at-will doctrine). Title VII
changed the at-will employment relationship by prohibiting an employer's discretion to
select among its employees based on their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. See
Chamallas, supra note 59, at 331-32; Willborn, supra note 11, at 821-22.
184. 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); supra note 94.
186. But cf Segal, supra note 36, at 140-41 (advocates of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment would limit disparate impact discrimination to that impact that "is traceable to and
reinforces, or perpetuates, discriminatory patterns similar to those associated with facial
discrimination") (quoting Equal Rights Amendment: Hearings on H.J. Res. 1 Before the
Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (testi-
mony of Ann Freedman)); Taub & Williams, supra note 70, at 841 (same limitation under
Title VII). But see Sherry, supra note 63, at 111 ("it is the evidence of prejudice against
one class, and not the fact that the classification may be based on inaccurate stereotypes
of both classes, that suggests the use of heightened scrutiny"). Moreover, group justice
theories would grant protection only to specific groups. See supra note 85; ef Livingston
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1986) (impact on disfavored
class relevant "because it is reasonable to presume that such a practice is a means by
which historical discrimination is perpetuated"); Blumrosen, supra note 45, at 103-06
(disparate impact applicable to minorities only under causation theory); Chamallas, supra
note 59, at 366-68 & n.300, 369 & n.312 (same).
Disparate treatment discrimination theory is also symmetrical, applying to all groups.
See McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
187. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Craig v. Alabama State
Univ., 804 F.2d 682, 688 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1990) ("A selection rate for any race, sex, or
ethnic group which is less than four-fifths ... of the rate for the group with the highest
rate will generally be regarded... as evidence of adverse impact.") (emphasis added); cf
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 677 n.25 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("Absent any showing that the 'underrepresentation' of whites in this stratum [can-
nery workers] is the result of a barrier to access, the 'overrepresentation' of nonwhites
does not offend Title VII"); Weisbord v. Michigan State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1347, 1352
(W.D. Mich. 1980) (refusing to dismiss disparate impact claim by white male). But cf
City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 n.20 (1978)
("Even under Title VII ... the male employees would not prevail [in challenging the
disparate impact of equal contributions by men and women to pension]. Even a com-
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natory whenever its criteria disproportionately eliminate any group,
whether it be a traditionally underrepresented group or Euro-American
males.
1 8 8
Both theories also agree that disparate impact doctrine would be appli-
cable only if the impact can be traced to the employer."8 9 Evidence of
abstract disparate impact in the employer's workforce compared with the
relevant labor pool would not establish a Title VII violation." ° The an-
tidiscrimination provision of Section 703(a) does not make an employer
pletely neutral practice will inevitably have some disproportionate impact on one group
or another. Griggs does not imply, and this Court has never held, that discrimination
must always be inferred from such consequences.").
188. To the extent that bottom-line statistics are correlated with disparate impact dis-
crimination in traditional selection criteria, see infra Section IIB2d, however, the theory
will benefit underrepresented groups more frequently than Euro-American males. This
result will aid in equalizing the unequal status quo. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31.
Allowing symmetrical application of disparate impact doctrine has been criticized for
ignoring American social history and for failing to allow employers to defend their affirm-
ative action programs by resort to disparate impact. See Colker, supra note 82, at 1034-
35; cf Segal, supra note 36, at 141 n.307 (progressive income tax excused at disparate
impact stage because it does not reinforce wage discrimination against women). Whether
the criterion perpetuated or remedied past invidious discrimination could be evaluated at
the business necessity stage, however. Courts have viewed as "compelling" an employer's
business purpose to remedy past discrimination. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 637 (1987); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979). Thus,
if a disparately impacting criterion helped remedy past discrimination, it might be ex-
cused as a business necessity.
189. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 672-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 1, supra note 14, at § 4; Robinson v.
Adams, 830 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987).
Although the majority and dissent in Wards Cove disagreed on the probative value of
evidence that a disproportionate number of nonwhite workers held the lower paying can-
nery jobs, both agreed that such evidence unconnected to employer's practices would not
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination. Compare Wards Cove,
490 U.S. at 651-52 (rejecting internal workforce comparison and requiring comparison
between the jobs at issue and the qualified population in the relevant labor market) with
id at 674-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (attributing internal disparity to employer where
work was seasonal and in remote areas of Alaska and where employer used facially neu-
tral criteria like nepotism, word-of-mouth recruitment, separate housing and mess halls).
Moreover, both the majority and dissent in Wards Cove would not hold the employer
responsible for the underrepresentation of whites in the cannery jobs. See iL at 653-54,
677 n.25; cf Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1982)
(rejecting proof of imbalance in the workforce because employee "has not shown, nor can
he show, that independent of other factors the employment practices he challenge[d] have
caused the racial imbalance in Prudential's work force"); EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship
Comm., 895 F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 1990) (remand for proof on causal connection between
statistical disparities and employer's practices).
Comparative evidence of an employer's applicants or the otherwise qualified popula-
tion and those actually hired would demonstrate the employer's responsibility for any
hiring disparity. See Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 805 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 53 (1990); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 52 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 39,537, at
60,495 (E.D.N.C. 1989). Moreover, evidence of comparisons within the employer's
workforce would demonstrate the employer's responsibility for any promotion disparity,
where the employer promotes from within. See Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1526
(11th Cir. 1985); Powers v. Alabama Dep't of Educ., 854 F.2d 1285, 1294-95 (11 th Cir.
1988).
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responsible for achieving proportional balance in its workforce; it only
prohibits the employer from causing such imbalances.' 9' Requiring an
employer to disprove its role in causing all otherwise unexplained imbal-
ances in its workforce is inconsistent with Title VII's antipreference pro-
vision. 192 Title VII, therefore, requires that the employees prove that the
impact is attributable to the employer. 93 The two theories disagree,
however, on exactly how to prove that an employer's criterion results in
a disparate impact based on the prohibited factors.
a. Causation of Impact
Although both theories require that the impact be attributable to the
employer,' 94 they differ on how precisely employees must isolate the
cause of the disparate impact. Effects Theorists allow employees to es-
tablish disparate impact by proving that one or more of the employer's
practices caused the impact.' 95 In contrast, Fault Theorists may 196 re-
quire employees to establish disparate impact by isolating the single crite-
rion that caused the impact. 197 The Supreme Court1 98 and Congress199
191. Section 703(a) of Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer to discriminate against an individual "because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
192. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651-53 (1989); Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991-93 (1988) (plurality); see also supra note
112 (quoting Title VII, § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988)).
193. Under the Effects Theory, employees can link the employer either to a disparity in
its workforce or to the employer's facially neutral criterion that causes an impact on the
population in the relevant labor market. See infra Sections IIB2a & IIB2b. Under the
Fault Theory, however, employees must link the employer both to a disparity in its
workforce and to the one facially neutral practice causing the impact. See id.
194. See supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text.
195. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 672-73 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1010 n.10 (1988) (Black-
mun, J., concurring); infra note 199.
196. The uncertainty regarding this dispute is due to the context in which the issue has
arisen. Fault Theorists demand that employees identify the disparately impacting prac-
tice in cases where employees failed to establish any connection between the disparate
impact on the employer's workforce and the employer's practice. See Wards Cove, 490
U.S. at 650-53; Watson, 487 U.S. at 983-84; Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668
F.2d 795, 800-01 (1982). In addition, the language used to specify the causation require-
ment ambiguously requires the employees to isolate the specific practice orpractices. See
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57; Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-97 (plurality); Pouncy, 668 F.2d
at 800-02. Moreover, requiring that employees isolate only one criterion reaffirms the
undisputed requirement that employees establish causation between the impact and the
employer, whether it be through one or more of the employer's practices, to avoid "em-
ployers being potentially liable for 'the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statis-
tical imbalances in the composition of their work forces.'" Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657
(citation omitted); accord Watson, 487 U.S. at 992 (plurality); Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 801-
02.
197. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57; Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (plurality). But cf
Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 Wayne L. Rev. 1235, 1266-69
(1988) (criticism of Watson).
198. See, e.g., Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57 (adopting a Fault Theory position).
199. Congress is considering legislation to adopt the position of the Effects Theory.
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are currently debating this causation issue.
To the Effects Theorists, proof that a group of the employer's criteria
results in disparate impact establishes that at least one of those practices
is a non-neutral barrier to the employment opportunities of a protected
group. Absent excuse, this violates Title VII. Even if the source of the
impact cannot be more precisely pinpointed, the Effects Theory requires
the employer either to disprove the impact or to justify the criteria as
necessary to its business.' Requiring the employer to bear these bur-
dens most effectively results in uncovering and, absent justification, in
eliminating non-neutrality in the selection process because the employer,
both architect and user of the process, has superior access to evidence
necessary for proof on these issues.
Analogously, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,-" the Supreme Court
shifted to the employer the burden of disproving discrimination once the
employee established a multiple causation disparate treatment case."°'
The ruling clarified that an employee need not prove that she was dis-
criminated against "solely" because of her protected status. 2" Similarly,
an employee should not have to prove that any one selection criterion
caused the disparate impact against her protected group. 2"
See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 1, supra note 14, at § 4 (employee responsible for
proving which specific practice caused disparate impact only if "the court finds that the
complaining party can identify, from records or other information of the respondent rea-
sonably available (through discovery or otherwise), which specific practice or practices
contributed to the disparate impact").
200. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 1, supra note 14, at § 4; Willborn, supra
note 11, at 829-30.
201. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
202. In Price Waterhouse, the employee proved that sex was a motivating or determi-
native factor in the decision not to make her a partner, but Price Waterhouse proved that
the employee's interpersonal skills were also motivating or determinative factors in the
decision. See id at 250-52. In the context of a disparate treatment case, a finding of
mixed motive amounts to a multiple causation case.
Based on evidence that gender was one motivating factor causing her rejection, the
Court shifted the burden of persuasion to the employer to prove that, even absent consid-
eration of her gender, Hopkins would have been rejected for non-discriminatory reasons.
See id at 250 (persuade by a preponderance of the evidence); id at 259 (White, J., con-
curring) (same); id at 261, 271 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with plurality to
shift burden of persuasion, but only upon proof by direct evidence).
203. Cf Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 672-73 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Although the causal link must have substance, the act need not constitute
the sole or primary cause of the harm.") (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 431-
433 (1965) and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)); 110 Cong. Rec. 2728
(1964) (rejecting amendment requiring sole causation).
204. Based on evidence that at least one of a group of an employer's selection criteria
resulted in a disparate impact, the employer should bear the burden of proving that each
criterion in that group either does not contribute to the impact or can be justified as a
business necessity.
The Price Waterhouse Court supported shifting the persuasion burden on policy
grounds because the employer's suspect consideration of gender necessitated considera-
tion of what would have happened had the employer not used gender and because the
employer had superior access to the evidence necessary to resolve the hypothetical ques-
tion. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 & n. 13. Policy would also support shifting
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The Fault Theory, by contrast, would require an employee to isolate
the single factor causing the disparate impact in order to safeguard em-
ployers' discretion in operating their businesses.2"5 Under that theory,
proof that one criterion had a disparate impact merely raises an inference
that the employer used that factor pretextually in violation of Title VII.
Where several of an employer's criteria are proved to have a disparate
impact, however, the inference of a violation becomes even more attenu-
ated. In such a case the employer would not be required either to dis-
prove the disparate effect or to explain the reasonableness of each of the
implicated criteria.2 '6 Thus, under the Fault Theory, because such proof
establishes only a somewhat attenuated inference of pretextual discrimi-
nation, the burden shifting under Price Waterhouse would be
unavailable.2 "7
Adoption of the Fault Theory's causation requirement might necessi-
tate more precise proof of causation for even single employment practices
that are viewed as consisting of complex, multiple subparts.2"' For ex-
ample, how would the employer's decision to use a multi-question exami-
nation2" be distinguished from using a multi-part selection process?210
More important, requiring that employees isolate the disparate effect
of each criterion insulates from challenge criteria for which no distinct
the burden of persuasion in a disparate impact case because the employer's suspect use of
at least one disparately impacting criterion necessitates isolation of the disparate impact's
cause and because the employer has superior access to the evidence necessary to resolve
that issue.
205. Cf. Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 800-01 (5th Cir. 1982)
(requiring that employee specify impacting criterion to give employer knowledge of chal-
lenged criterion and to promote fair allocation of burdens at trial); Rutherglen, supra
note 36, at 1340 (limiting employees' causation obligation to requiring notice of practices
challenged); Cox II, supra note 11, at 782 (requiring isolation of cause of impact only at
trial).
206. The Fault Theorists are concerned that by easing up on the connection between
the criterion and the impact, "the distinction between disparate impact and disparate
treatment would diminish and intent would become a largely discarded element." Atonio
v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 1985), reheard en banc on
other grounds, 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987). They also support requiring isolation of the
criterion causing the impact to make disparate impact cases more manageable for the
courts. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text. But see Willbom, supra note 11,
at 830-31 (manageability is "insufficient justification for immunizing all nonspecific crite-
ria from disparate impact attack").
207. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270-73 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
208. See American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. State of Washing-
ton, 770 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985).
209. The Supreme Court has consistently found disparate impact resulting from a
multi-question examination to be sufficient evidence of causation under disparate impact
doctrine. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452 (1982); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
210. Cf Arnold v. United States Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (em-
ployer's Career Path Policy, consisting of three steps, counted as one selection criterion).
But cf infra Section IIB2d (Fault Theory would examine employer's process only where
adverse effect occurred at the bottom line).
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disparate impact evidence exists.2 11 For example, in Powers v. Alabama
Department of Education,21 2 employees challenged the many practices
comprising the state's complicated promotion process.213 Alabama did
not argue that the disparate impact was caused by factors other than its
discriminatory practices, a defense that would have succeeded under
either the Fault or Effects Theory.2 4  Rather, the state defended by
pointing to the employees' failure to isolate the specific cause of the dis-
parate impact. Indeed, the employer obfuscated detection of the cause by
arguing that the proved effect resulted not from the practice under con-
sideration at the moment, but from another practice that was also chal-
lenged. 2 5 Recognizing the circularity of the state's defense, the court of
appeals remanded with instructions that the state show either that its
requirements did not have a discriminatory effect or that they were justi-
fied as a business necessity. 2 6 Thus, the Powers court resolved the causa-
tion issue consistent with the Effects Focused Theory.21 '
As Powers illustrates, disallowing challenge to a group of employer
practices provides an incentive for employers to create multilayered, ill-
defined selection processes "to shield from liability an employer whose
211. Cf Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658 n.10 (1989) (company
exempted from keeping records on impact of its practices because it was only seasonal
employer); id. at 673 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (company failed to keep records from
which employees could prove distinct cause of impact); Wilkins v. University of Houston,
654 F.2d 388, 402 (5th Cir. 1981) (salary determined by simultaneous operation of multi-
ple factors that cannot be factored independently); Uniform Guidelines on Employee Se-
lection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15 (1990) (employer's obligation to keep records of
bottom-line impact is narrower than its exposure for within-the-process impact, see infra
Section 11B2d). Of course, where the disparately impacting criterion can be identified,
the employer would not be required to justify any criteria except those causing the im-
pact. See, eg., Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 536, 538-39 & n.l I (5th Cir.
1982) (no need to validate all components of hiring process where employee can precisely
evaluate impact of each component and only written test resulted in statistically signifi-
cant impact).
212. 854 F.2d 1285 (11th Cir. 1988).
213. See id. at 1295. The promotion process required eligible employees-those attain-
ing certain minimum experience in the next lower job classification-to apply for promo-
tion. Such employees were first ranked on the basis of 45% education and training, 45%
experience, and 10% supervisory evaluations; if those rankings were high enough, they
were certified and interviewed. See id at 1288-89.
214. See supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text.
215. Alabama sought to avoid justification of its evaluation process by arguing that the
disparity resulted from its experience requirement, a practice also subject to challenge.
See Powers, 854 F.2d at 1293-94. In addition, the district court rejected the employees'
statistics because they failed to control for employees who did not apply, despite the fact
that it would have been futile to apply absent meeting the eligibility requirements that
were also challenged. The district court also rejected the statistics because they failed to
control for employees who were not certified, despite the fact that the evaluation process
was one factor in the decision to certify and that the certification process was also subject
to challenge. See id at 1296-98.
216. See Powers v. Alabama Dep't of Educ., 854 F.2d 1285, 1299 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
217. See id. at 1292 n.11, 1293 n.13 (although recognizing the plurality decision in
Watson, the court continued to follow contrary 11 th circuit precedent, waiting for a ma-
jority to adopt the Watson opinion, which the Supreme Court did in Wards Cove).
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selection process is so poorly defined that no specific criterion can be
identified with any certainty, let alone be connected to the disparate ef-
fect.",218 Allowing employers to insulate themselves from challenge by
combining criteria so that the impact of any one component is not ascer-
tainable would undermine disparate impact doctrine, regardless of the
theory.
The debate over challenge to multiple factors is reminiscent of the de-
bate over whether disparate impact doctrine allowed challenge to subjec-
tive criteria.2 19 To the extent that either the subjectivity or multiplicity
of the employer's selection process obscures precise definition of the em-
ployment qualifications used, it also obscures potential bias or pretext.220
Indeed, it is precisely these selection criteria that require judicial scrutiny
to ensure equal employment opportunity.221 Just as the Supreme Court
ruled222 that an employer's use of subjective criteria does not protect it
from claims of disparate impact discrimination,223 the use of multiple
criteria or one criterion with multiple components should similarly not
afford immunity.
b. Impact on Whom?
The two theories also disagree about whether the disparate effect of an
employer's criterion can be proved by evidence of an effect on individuals
in the relevant labor pool or only by proof of an effect on actual appli-
cants or otherwise qualified individuals. 224 The Effects Theory allows
218. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1010 n.10 (1988) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part); see also Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1340 (moderating require-
ment to isolate criterion by allowing employee to prove connection between multiple cri-
teria with aggregate impact); Cox II, supra note 11, at 782 (excusing requirement to plead
exact cause of impact to avoid employer hiding behind employee's ignorance of its
process).
219. See supra Section HIBla.
220. See Rose, Subjective Employment Practices: Does the Discriminatory Impact Anal-
ysis Apply?, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 63, 93 (1988).
221. See supra Section HIBla.
222. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
223. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989-91 (1988); Friedman,
supra note 36, at 72 n.109; see also Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 52 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 39,537, at 60,499 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (where "the surviving officials still working
for defendant have no idea of the bases on which they made their employment decisions[,]
... the identification by plaintiffs of the uncontrolled, subjective discretion of defendant's
employing officials as the source of the discrimination.., sufficed to satisfy the causation
requirements of Wards Cove."); Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 805 (3d Cir.) (em-
ployees identified disparately impacting criteria to be a subjective interview process "con-
sisting essentially of combining the gut reactions to the applicant of employees in the
personnel office and one or more foremen in the plant"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 53
(1990).
224. The evidentiary debate in this Section focuses on proving the adverse effect of one
of the employer's facially neutral criteria. Thus, the debate presumes that the criterion is
attributable to the employer. See supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text. More-
over, the debate focuses on only one of the employer's criteria. But cf supra Section
IIB2a (dealing with multiple causation question).
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evidence of disparate impact at the societal level. Thus, in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,"-5 the Supreme Court allowed the employees to use census
figures to demonstrate that the company's high school diploma require-
ment had a racially disparate impact and to use another employer's test
results to demonstrate that the company's test requirement also had a
racially disparate impact."26 Similarly, in Dothard v. Rawlinson,227 rely-
ing on census figures for the entire nation, the Court found that Ala-
bama's height and weight criteria disparately impacted on women,228
noting that "[tihere is no requirement... that a statistical showing of
disproportionate impact must always be based on analysis of the charac-
teristics of actual applicants."' 2 9
The Fault Theory, on the other hand, requires proof of disparate im-
pact on the employer's actual candidates or otherwise qualified and inter-
ested individuals. 230  Thus, in New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer,231 the Supreme Court questioned whether employees' evidence
that sixty-three percent of the methadone-maintained people in New
York City's public programs were black or Hispanic established that the
Transit Authority's rule excluding methadone-maintained persons had a
disparate impact based on race or national origin. 3 2 The Court found
the evidence "weak" at best,' 33 criticizing the figures in part because they
did not indicate how many participants in methadone-maintenance pro-
grams ever worked or sought work with the Transit Authority.' 3  In
effect, the Court demanded evidence of harm to actual applicants or em-
ployees of the Transit Authority. 35
In sum, the Fault Theorists reject evidence of disparate effect in soci-
ety236 in favor of evidence from the employer's actual applicants," 7 ab-
225. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
226. See id. at 430 & n.6, 432.
227. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
228. See id. at 329-30 & n.12.
229. Id. at 330; accord id at 337-39 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). But see id. at 348
(White, J., dissenting) (requiring impact on actual applicants absent showing by plaintiff/
employee that those statistics are distorted by the employer's discrimination).
230. See Gold, supra note 19, at 439-45.
231. 440 U.S. 568 0979).
232. See id at 585-86.
233. See ido at 587. But see id at 598-600 (White, J., dissenting) (societal figures prove
disparate impact).
234. See id at 585. The Court also criticized the evidence because it did not account
for methadone-maintained persons in private programs, see id at 585-86 & n.27, nor did
it establish that participants in methadone maintenance programs were otherwise em-
ployable, i.e. enrolled in the methadone program for over a year, not using illicit drugs, or
not already employed. See id at 585-86. Unless either the racial/ethnic make-up of
methadone-maintained persons in private programs differed from public programs or the
racial/ethnic make-up between otherwise employable and unemployable methadone-
maintained persons differed, the Court's criticisms would not alter the conclusion that the
employer's no-methadone rule had a disparate effect based on race and national origin.
See id at 599-601 & n.7 (White, J., dissenting).
235. See id. at 583-87.
236. Societal evidence of impact would be unavailable for criteria such as subjective
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sent employee's evidence that this is inappropriate.23 a The Effects
Theorists, however, allow impact to be proved with evidence from the
general population in the relevant labor market 39 as well as from the
employer's actual candidates or otherwise qualified individuals.
The evidentiary debate about the necessity of requiring proof of dispa-
rate impact on the employer's workforce or otherwise qualified candi-
dates cannot be explained by logic. For example, to establish that the
employer's practices caused the impact2" ° logically requires eliminating
the inference that particularized geographical constraints24' or legitimate
qualifications,242 rather than the employer's challenged requirements,
caused the impact. By necessity, societal impact would be irrelevant to
prove this proposition.243 To establish the impact of the criterion, how-
evaluations or selection criteria unique to the employer. In those instances, the only
available evidence would be the impact on the employer's applicants. See Shoben, supra
note 71, at 8.
237. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-55 (1989); Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 996-97 (1988) (plurality); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321, 348 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.,
708 F.2d 475, 482 (9th Cir. 1983); Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 51 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 39,355, at 59,452 (D. Neb. 1989), rev'd, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,565, at
65,957 (8th Cir. 1991); Cox II, supra note 11, at 773.
238. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367
(1977) (prior discrimination may discourage minority applicants); Dothard, 433 U.S. at
330 (applicant pool evidence may be inappropriate "since otherwise qualified people
might be discouraged from applying because of a self-recognized inability to meet the
very standards challenged as being discriminatory"); Shoben, Employee Recruitment by
Design or Default: Uncertainty Under Title VII, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 891, 891 (1986) (recruit-
ing techniques can have impact on applicant pool).
239. See Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) V 40,565, at
65,957 (8th Cir. 1991). But see Boardman & Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 Law & Contemp. Probs. 189, 216 0983) (limiting
population to those with necessary specialized skills); Friedman, supra note 36, at 69 n.95
(same); Shoben, supra note 71, at 34-35 (same).
Population data ought to be preferred because legally relevant impact is defined in
terms of impact on all potential applicants, not merely those to whom the criterion was
applied. See Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical
Proof under Title VII, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 793, 798 (1978); Shoben, supra note 71, at 8. To
extrapolate impact on the pool of all potential applicants from impact on a sample of that
group requires testing for statistical significance. See infra notes 265-266 and accompa-
nying text.
240. See supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text.
241. See e.g., Robinson v. Adams, 830 F.2d 128, 133-34 (9th Cir. 1987) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) (requiring appropriate geographic statistics to establish that employer's prac-
tices caused disparate impact); cf League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa
Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 897 (C.D. Calif. 1976) (city would not be responsible for hiring
from entire county rather than from city if it could "demonstrate that economic forces
beyond [its] control dictated that Orange County would provide the bulk of applicants").
242. Only qualifications that are not challenged, that have no impact or that are
proved to satisfy business necessity would be deemed legitimate. See supra introduction
to Section IIB.
243. Similarly, to establish purposeful discrimination under the disparate treatment
theory would logically require proof that accounted for all the explicitly nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for which the employer rejected the employees. See Hazelwood School Dist.
v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977); cf Maltz, supra note 15, at 347 n.13 (distin-
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ever, there is no inherent reason to limit the proof of impact to applicants
or otherwise qualified individuals. Consequently, the evidentiary choice
can only be explained by distinctions between the theories.
The Effects Theory examines employers' use of any non-neutral crite-
ria. Demonstrating discriminatory effect by either societal or workforce
evidence would therefore be sufficient to establish the criterion's non-
neutrality. The Fault Theory, by contrast, focuses on an employer's un-
reasonable use of a criterion as a way to reveal pretextual discrimination
based on the prohibited factors. An employer's application of a facially
neutral criterion that does not disparately affect its workforce would un-
dercut the inference that the employer used the facially neutral criterion
pretextually. 244
Limiting proof of a criterion's impact to its impact on applicants or
otherwise qualified individuals actually combines two distinct causation
questions: the neutrality of the selection criterion-whether the em-
ployer's practice has a disparate impact based on a prohibited factor, and
the standing of the plaintiff-employees to recover-whether the employ-
ees seeking redress were adversely affected by the disparately impacting
criterion, rather than another legitimate criterion. The Fault Theory, fo-
cusing on the employer's unreasonable use of the criterion, resolves both
causation questions together. 45 The Effects Theory, however, keeps the
questions separate:214 evidence of disparate impact on society would es-
tablish the criterion's non-neutrality; evidence that the employees were
adversely affected by this policy, and not by another legitimate criterion,
would establish their standing.247
The consequences of the Fault Theory's restricting proof of impact to
applicants, employees or otherwise qualified individuals are multiple. In-
itially, such a restriction allows the employer to shift the focus among its
exclusionary criteria in a circular fashion. Indeed, where the employees
challenge more than one of the employer's selection criteria, the merit of
each of those criteria becomes the critical issue. It would be inappropri-
ate to allow an employer to bar challenge to one criterion by requiring
guishing between using proof of impact to establish disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment cases); Shoben, In Defense of Disparate Impact Analysis Under Ttle VII: A Reply to
Dr. Cohn, 55 Ind. LJ. 516, 516 (1980) (clarifying distinction between using evidence of
disparate impact to prove discriminatory purpose compared with proving the impact of
employer's selection criteria). But cf Shoben, supra note 71, at 8-9 (distinctions between
uses of disparate impact not always explicit).
244. Cf Cox I, supra note 11, at 55-56 (requiring impact on applicants consistent with
theory focusing on illicit motive).
245. Cf supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text. Under the Fault Theory, an
employer could defend a showing of impact with a showing that the population used to
prove the disparate impact was not harmed by the employer's use of the criterion.
246. See Welch, supra note 4, at 869-77; cf Cox I, supra note I1, at 56-57 (breaking
out questions of impact and standing to support group rights theory of disparate impact).
247. Under the Effects Theory, employees use evidence of societal impact not to create
a class action from the population at large, but rather to demonstrate one essential ele-
ment of the case-the disparate impact of the selection criterion.
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proof of compliance with another challenged criterion.248
More practically, limiting proof of disparate impact to the effect
caused by a particular criterion holds disparate impact doctrine hostage
to availability of evidence, which to some extent is controlled by the em-
ployer. Indeed, those employers with particularly poor records for em-
ploying traditionally underrepresented groups would be in the best
position to avoid challenge to their criteria because virtually no members
of the previously excluded group would be candidates for opportuni-
ties, 249 particularly opportunities to be distributed among those already
employed.250 Moreover, individual employees would be barred from
challenging criteria that the employer applies to too small a sample
group 25 1 or r which the employer keeps no records from which to de-
tect disparate impact.2 52
Even where the employer is not responsible for the lack of evidence by
which to establish disparate impact at its workplace,25 3 why should any
individual adversely affected by a facially neutral criterion that tends to
cause harm in the relevant labor market be unable to challenge the crite-
rion because of lack of evidence254 or because this application of the cri-
248. See supra notes 213-216 and accompanying text; cf Schultz, Telling Stories about
Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title
VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1749, 1762 n.44
(1990) (presumption that only those who satisfy the requirements are interested enough to
apply undercuts disparate impact analysis).
Even where a criterion is interrelated with an admittedly meritorious qualification, it
would be appropriate to use societal evidence to establish the disparate impact of the
challenged criterion. For example, societal evidence, if available, could be used to prove
the impact of requiring a certain score on the National Teachers Examination even where
there is no dispute that employees must be certified teachers to be eligible for the job. But
cf Shoben, supra note 71, at 34-35 (requiring impact on group possessing other legitimate
qualification). Rather than allow a court to determine the interrelationship between the
challenged and unchallenged criteria, it would be more appropriate to find impact based
on evidence from the broader population, because at the business-necessity stage the em-
ployer would be able to justify its challenged criterion using evidence from the valid
criterion, if in fact an interrelationship exists. All independently required employment
qualifications should be independently scrutinized to avoid validating one criterion
merely by pointing to a related criterion.
249. See supra note 238.
250. See Blumrosen, supra note 45, at 92.
251. See Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dep't, 766 F.2d 650, 657 n.7 (1st Cir. 1985);
Welch, supra note 4, at 877.
252. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 673 n.20 (1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
253. See, e.g., Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658 n.10 (seasonal employers exempted from
recordkeeping); Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.15 (1990) (employers must keep records only where employer's process results in
impact at bottom line).
254. See, e.g., Rule v. Local 396, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental
Ironworkers, 568 F.2d 558, 566 (8th Cir. 1977) (proof that high school or equivalency
requirement for apprenticeship program had impact on blacks from census data from
five-county area); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 949 (D. Neb. 1986)
(proof that rule against pregnancy for single employees, previously applied in only three
instances, discriminates against black females by relying on statistics from the county or
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teflon happened to result in no impact at the employer's workplace? 2"
As a policy matter, equal employment opportunity is too important a
goal to jeopardize on such grounds.256 Allowing challenge based on evi-
dence that an employer's facially neutral criterion has an impact on soci-
ety helps eliminate "discriminat[ion] against any individual ... because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 7
Moreover, an employer's criterion that disparately impacts on groups
in society but not in the employer's workplace occurs only in the excep-
tional case where the employer's workforce is skewed: for example,
either where the makeup of the employer's workforce based on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin does not reflect the relevant labor
market or where the members of the impacted group within the em-
ployer's workforce already resemble the group preferred by the crite-
rion.258 The sharpest example of this phenomenon would be where an
employer purposefully restricted job opportunities to one protected
group. In Costa v. Markey,259 the municipality restricted certain police
force positions to women. Applying a. Fault Theory rationale, the court
rejected a challenge that the municipality's minimum height requirement
had an impact on women where the criterion was applied only to wo-
men.2" Effects Theorists, on the other hand, would have found the crite-
rion to be non-neutral based on sex, as demonstrated by societal data,
and would have required that the preference be justified as a business
necessity. Failure to justify the height requirement allowed an impermis-
sible preference for those women who happened to be most like men, the
state as a whole); Welch, supra note 4, at 868-69, 877 (process of separating impact issue
from issue of adverse affect on parties before the court "provides a mechanism for consid-
ering... sample size and group results, while not losing sight of the majority's emphasis
on the opportunity each individual is afforded in the employment setting"); cf. Maltz,
supra note 15, at 348 (reliance on great disparities in general statistics justified because
other evidence may not be available).
255. See infra notes 258-261 and accompanying text. Requiring scrutiny only where
an employer's criterion results in impact at its workplace allows an employer to avoid
responsibility for using an admittedly non-neutral standard whose disparate effect on
their workforce is too inconsequential to establish disparate impact. Cf. Schultz, supra
note 248, at 1824-39 (exploring role of workplace standards in shaping employee atti-
tudes and choices about work).
256. Cf. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 674 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("a court should not strive for numerical exactitude at the expense of the
needs of the particular case").
257. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1988).
258. Both situations raise concerns about the employer's commitment to equal em-
ployment opportunity.
259. 706 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982), reh'd en banc, 706 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1983).
260. See Costa, 706 F.2d at 11-12; see also MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d
1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988) (rejecting disparate impact theory where applicable treaty al-
lowed preference for native citizens), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989); Rigler, Connecti-
cut v. Teak The Supreme Court's Latest Exposition of Disparate Impact Anal)tsis, 59
Notre Dame L. Rev. 313, 324 (1984) ("one cannot argue that the height requirement in
Costa was more beneficial to men than to women; rather, it was more beneficial to tall
women"); Willborn, supra note 11, at 833-34 ("although use of the height requirement
may have constituted statistical discrimination, it did not constitute sex discrimination").
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traditional incumbents of the police force. Adopting the Effects Theory,
which allows the use of societal evidence to prove impact, would extend
Title VII protection under disparate impact doctrine regardless of
whether an employer's application of the criterion harmed sufficient
numbers of actual applicants or employees, thereby providing protection
in even exceptional, and perhaps discriminatory, 261 circumstances.
c. How Much Impact?
Although both theories require evidence that the impact on protected
groups be disproportionate,262 the precise level of that impact is subject
to debate.2 63 Under the Effects Theory, discrimination occurs where the
correlation between the facially neutral criterion and the protected char-
acteristic is statistically significant. The Fault Theory requires a more
substantial correlation.
The debate is complicated by the issue of where to measure the impact.
Effects Theorists seek to prove that the challenged criterion has a dispro-
portionate impact on the population in the relevant labor market.26 Be-
cause there is usually no direct evidence of the impact of an employer's
criterion on that population, 265 employees must resort to inferential
proof based on the criterion's impact on only a sample population. To
establish that the impact on a sample population is representative of the
impact on a larger population, it is appropriate to evaluate the sample's
statistical significance.266 Thus, the Effects Theorists find discrimination
261. See, e.g., Costa, 706 F.2d at 11 (absent approval from Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination, hiring from female-only list would be illegal).
262. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658 (1989) (Black-
mun, J., concurring) ("significantly disparate impact"); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 & n.3 (1988) (plurality) ("sufficiently substantial"); Connecti-
cut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 & n.4, 446 (1982) ("significantly discriminatory impact"
demonstrated by black-to-white pass rate of 68%); New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-86 & n.30 (1979) ("denying ... equal access to employment
opportunities" not strongly evidenced where rule excluded between 40-50% black or His-
panic candidates compared with population of 36.3% blacks or Hispanics); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) ("significantly discriminatory pattern" demon-
strated where criteria excluded 33.29% and 22.29% women compared with 1.28% and
2.35% men, respectively); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)
("significantly different"); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426, 430 & n.6
(1971) ("substantially higher rate" found with pass rates of 34% for whites compared
with 12% for blacks and 58% for whites compared with 6% for blacks); see also City of
Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710-11 n.20 (1978)
("Even a completely neutral practice will inevitably have some disproportionate impact
on one group or another. Griggs does not imply, and this Court has never held, that
discrimination must always be inferred from such consequences.").
263. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95 & n.3 (plurality); M. Zimmer, C. Sullivan, & R.
Richards, supra note 79, at 247-54.
264. See supra Section IIB2b.
265. See Cohn, On the Use of Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, 55 Ind.
L.J. 493, 494 (1980).
266. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 598 n.3 (1979) (White,
J., dissenting); Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dep't, 766 F.2d 650, 657-58 (1st Cir.
1984); Boardman & Vining, supra note 239, at 204-05; Cox I, supra note 11, at 61; Cox II,
1991] DISPARATE IMPACT
where the correlation between the facially neutral criterion and a prohib-
ited factor is statistically significant.267 As a rule of thumb,26 courts
might set the level of significance so that the probability of obtaining the
same disproportionate results by chance alone is less than five percent.269
In the unusual case, however, where there is evidence of impact on the
entire population, the impact can be measured directly, without resort to
statistical significance."' With such direct evidence of impact on the
population in the relevant labor market, the Effects Theory would theo-
retically find discriminatory bias from any discrepancy,27' without judg-
ing its magnitude.
By contrast, Fault Theorists, who are concerned only with a criterion's
impact on actual applicants or otherwise qualified individuals, 272 find sta-
tistical techniques unnecessary where there is direct evidence of such im-
supra note 11, at 773-74; Follett and Welch, Testing for Discrimination in Employment
Practices, 46 Law & Contemp. Probs. 171, 174 0983); Shoben, supra note 239, at 799-800.
267. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 598 n.3 (White, J., dissenting); Fudge, 766 F.2d at 658-59
n.10; Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); Black Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n v. City of Akron, 52
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 39,510, at 60,302-03 (N.D. Ohio 1989), aff'd, 920 F.2d 932
(6th Cir. 1990); Shoben, supra note 239, at 800.
268. See, eg., Shoben, supra note 37, at 241 n. 130 ("Arguing in favor of specific signifi-
cance levels is not meant to suggest that such levels should be used arbitrarily in all cases.
A generally agreed upon guideline is desirable, however, for ease of administration and
for consistency of application.").
269. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 n. 17 0977); Shoben, supra note 239,
at 800; cf Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308.09 n. 14, 311 n. 17
(1977) (discussing statistical techniques without requiring a precise probability level); Ot-
taviani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 370-73 (2d Cir. 1989) (refusing
to adopt rule of law setting levels of statistical significance for rebuttable presumption of
disparate treatment discrimination), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 721 0990); Vuyanich v. Re-
public Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 272-73 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (recognizing
need for flexibility in adopting standard of significance); D. Baldus & J. Cole, Statistical
Proof of Discrimination 291 0980) (five percent rule used for non-judicial purposes); Fol-
lett and Welch, supra note 266, at 174 (five percent rule used by scientists). A higher
level of statistical significance would carry "greater risks of conclusions of insignificant
difference when treatment is truly disparate and smaller risks of convicting innocent par-
ties". Id at 175; accord Shoben, supra note 37, at 240-41; cf Boardman & Vining, supra
note 239, at 204-05 (magnitude of difference and probability that difference would occur
by chance are related, but distinct concepts: "the larger the difference the lower the
probability that it could have occurred by chance"); Kaye, Statistical Significance and the
Burden of Persuasion, 46 Law & Contemp. Probs. 13, 13-14 (Autumn 1983) (statistical
significance discusses probability of sample results occurring by chance which is related,
but distinguishable, from confidence level that discrimination occurred).
270. See Shoben, supra note 239, at 798-99; cf. Vuyanich, 505 F. Supp. at 272 (noting
debate on usefulness of statistical tests where data drawn from entire population); Cohn,
supra note 265, at 494 (statistics drawn from sample can be used to raise inference regard-
ing total population).
271. See Shoben, supra note 239, at 809-10; cf Cox I, supra note 11, at 60 (requiring
more substantial impact may more efficiently allocate judicial resources). But see
Willborn, supra note 11, at 822-25 (above a certain threshold, any level of impact would
require business necessity justification, which is tailored to level of impact).
272. See supra Section IIB2b.
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pact.27 3 In such a case, they require a "sufficiently substantial '274
disparity. Where the evidence of impact comes from sample data, how-
ever, they would also require statistical significance. 27" Regardless of
whether statistical significance is required, the Fault Theorists always de-
mand "practical" 276 or "substantial" 277 impact. This greater impact is
necessary to raise the inference that the employer used the criterion to
distinguish between candidates based on their membership in protected
groups.278 As with the inference of discriminatory intent under disparate
treatment discrimination, 279 evidence of disparate impact must be more
dramatic to raise the inference of pretext/unreasonableness. 280 Addi-
tionally, this fault-based theory would hold employers responsible for
only that impact about which they should have been aware.281 Under
the Fault Theory, statistically significant but less dramatic impact would
not be judged sufficiently "substantial" to compel judicial scrutiny.
Although both theories find discrimination where the magnitude of the
impact is high and neither find discrimination absent a statistically signif-
icant impact, they differ when there is moderate impact on protected
273. The debate over the relevant population for proving impact informs the debate
over whether statistical techniques are useful. See Cox I, supra note 11, at 62. Compare
Cohn, supra note 265, at 494-99 (statistical tests of significance irrelevant where impact
data drawn from entire pool of test-takers); Cohn, Statistical Laws and the Use of Statis-
tics in Law: A Rejoinder to Professor Shoben, 55 Ind. L.J. 537, 539-41 (1980) (test-takers
constitute entire population of candidates) with Shoben, supra note 243, at 516-24 (test-
takers are only sample of larger population including potential candidates).
274. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 (1988) (plurality).
275. See Cox II, supra note 11, at 773-74, 783-84 (statistical significance in this case
used to eliminate chance, thereby undercutting inference of pretext).
276. See Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 51 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 39,355, at
59,449, 59,452 (D. Neb. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
40,565 (8th Cir. 1991).
277. See Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1510-11 n.4 (10th Cir. 1987).
278. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 & n.3 (1988)
(plurality); Cox I, supra note 11, at 60-61; Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1324.
279. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40
& n.20 (1977) (overwhelming statistics of impact raises inference of discriminatory intent
in disparate treatment case); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976) ("total or
seriously disproportionate" impact demonstrates discriminatory intent); Chamallas,
supra note 59, at 321-22 & n.84 ("while a certain level of statistical proof of adverse
impact in a disparate impact challenge may well satisfy plaintiff's burden of proving...
unintentional discrimination, the same showing may not be strong enough to raise an
inference of intentional discrimination"). But cf Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-12 (1977) (discussing statistical significance in disparate treat-
ment case where issue is inference of discriminatory intent).
280. But cf Metroflight, 814 F.2d at 1510-11 n.4 (adopting more rigorous standard for
disparate impact than disparate treatment); Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 51 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 39,355, at 59,452 (D. Neb. 1989) (consciously using standard from
disparate treatment for disparate impact), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 40,565 (8th Cir. 1991).
281. See Shoben, supra note 37, at 223, 242-44. Employers are already obligated to
track the impact of their criteria. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Proce-
dures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15A(2)(a) (1990). It would not be much more burdensome also
to require that they evaluate such impact for statistical significance.
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groups. Practically, the distinction is even narrower because less dra-
matic impacts on smaller samples would not be statistically significant. 2
Thus, only the Effects Theorists would require judicial scrutiny for statis-
tically significant impact on larger samples, while the Fault Theorists
might judge that impact to "be so small that it is not practically signifi-
cant from an economic, managerial, or legal point of view."" 3
There are two consequences of the Fault Theory's demanding a higher
level of impact than statistical significance. Initially, requiring "eco-
nomic" or "managerial" significance to establish legal significance ac-
counts only for the employer's perspective. From the perspective of
those excluded by the practice, necessarily large numbers of people,2 '
the impact may not seem so small. Moreover, from society's perspective,
practices that exclude large numbers of protected people ought to be jus-
tified. Although the employer could protect against liability by examin-
ing the impact of its selection criteria 85 and by justifying all criteria
resulting in statistically significant impact, the excluded employees would
have no protection against an interpretation of Title VII that ignored
statistically significant but "not practically significant" 28 6 impacts.
Additionally, at what level would the impact be sufficient to require
justification? The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") provides one guideline:
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than
four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the
highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of adverse impact .... 287
This standard has been criticized on statistical288 and other grounds, 2
8 9
282. See Boardman & Vining, supra note 239, at 204-06.
283. Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1323-24; accord Gold, supra note 19, at 450. Be-
cause the degree of magnitude of impact increases with the level of significance, see
Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 271-72 (N.D. Tex. 1980),
the dispute between the theories might be moderated by requiring a higher level of signifi-
cance for cases of larger samples. See Shoben, supra note 37, at 241 & n. 130; supra note
269.
284. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
285. Cf Shoben, supra note 37, at 243-44 (self-examination, as required by agency
guidelines, heightens awareness of exclusionary patterns).
286. See Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1323.
287. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D
(1990).
288. The criticism arises because the standard (i) fails to account for differences in
sample size, thereby finding adverse impact in small samples where the discrepancy is not
statistically significant, and (ii) fails to find adverse impact in large samples where the
discrepancy is statistically significant. See Boardman & Vining, supra note 239, at 212-
16; Shoben, supra note 239, at 806-10. It has also been criticized for other technical
reasons that point out its inflexibility. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 19, at 447-48 (rule
applicable only to pass rates); Shoben, supra note 239, at 810-11 (rule fails to account for
magnitude of difference or to translate from pass rates to fail rates); cf Fudge v. City of
Providence Fire Dep't., 766 F.2d 650, 658-59 n.10 (1st Cir. 1984) (rejecting four-fifths
rule where small sample size); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir.
1981) (same), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
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highlighting its arbitrariness.29 In light of the difficulties encountered in
setting a standard of substantiality, an alternative to rejecting statistical
significance might be to leave the determination of substantiality to the
courts' discretion.29 That alternative, however, merely begs the
question.
In contrast, the Effects Theory provides clearer guidance on the level
of impact necessary to establish disparate impact discrimination: there
must be either a statistically significant impact on a sample population or
any impact on the entire population. Moreover, rather than adopt the
Fault Theory and cut off judicial scrutiny by deciding that the impact is
not sufficiently substantial despite its statistical significance, it would be
more appropriate to adopt the impact standard of the Effects Theory and
allow judicial scrutiny of the criterion. This is particularly desirable be-
cause the employer's concerns about the insubstantiality of the impact
would be factored into the court's consideration of the availability of
lesser impacting alternatives at the business necessity stage.2
92
d. Bottom-Line Defense
The two theories also disagree over whether proportional results at the
bottom line of the selection process immunize from challenge the dispa-
rate impact caused by any one criterion considered alone.2 93 Effects The-
orists would find discrimination and demand proof of business necessity
for each disparately impacting criterion in the selection process, regard-
less of whether the process results in proportionality. For example, in
Connecticut v. Teal,294 the Supreme Court found a prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination where the employer rejected employees
who failed an examination that had a pass rate for African-Americans
that was only sixty-eight percent of the pass rate for Euro-Americans,
even though the employer ultimately promoted African-Americans at
170% of the promotion rate for Euro-Americans.2 95 Although the bot-
289. The standard has also been criticized because it judges the impact only at the
bottom line, see Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4C (1990), and because it measures the impact only on actual applicants. See
Boardman & Vining, supra note 239, at 211-12; Cohn, supra note 265, at 501-04; Shoben,
supra note 71, at 29-32. To some extent these criticisms relate to the evidentiary debates
discussed in Section IIB2b, supra, and Section IIB2d, infra.
290. See Boardman & Vining, supra note 239, at 212; Gold, supra note 19, at 450. But
cf. supra note 268 (setting level of significance requires flexibility).
291. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988) (plurality)
(preferring case-by-case approach).
292. See infra Section IIB3a(iii); cf Cox I, supra note 11, at 60 (substantiality of im-
pact level creates balance between employees' equality interests and employers' efficiency
interests).
293. This potential defense actually rebuts the disparate impact of the criterion,
whereas the business necessity defense, see infra Section 1IB3, does not rebut the dispa-
rate impact, but rather seeks to excuse it.
294. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
295. See id. at 443 & n.4, 444-45 & n.6; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens
v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 895 (C.D. Cal. 1976) ("employers should not be
DISPARATE IMPACT
tom-line promotions were favorable to African-Americans, the employer
was nonetheless liable for discrimination because one criterion in the pro-
motion process, the test, eliminated a disproportionate number of Afri-
can-Americans.
296
To ensure neutrality, the Effects Theory examines every criterion in a
selection process. Indeed, when an overall selection process results in
proportionality yet one criterion in the process adversely affects a partic-
ular group, there must be another criterion that favors that group. 297
Thus, proportional outcome in the face of one disparately impacting cri-
terion would evidence a doubly non-neutral process, contrary to the
goals of the Effects Theory.
The Fault Theorists, on the other hand, find no adverse impact where
the employer's bottom-line selections result in no disparate impact. Us-
ing this approach, the Teal dissent disputed the finding of discrimination
because there was no adverse impact on African-Americans at the point
in the process where the promotions were made2 98 and because there was
no ultimate impact on the group of African-Americans as a whole.2
Proponents of this theory argue that the determinative impact occurs at
the bottom line because it is at that point that the harm-in Teal, the loss
of promotion-actually occurred. 3" Moreover, they would measure the
relieved of the burden of defending [a] procedure [that adversely affects protected groups]
merely because it did not constitute the entirety of the hiring process"); cf New York
City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 n.25 (1979) (evaluating disparate impact
discrimination notwithstanding more-than-proportional minority representation at the
bottom line). But see Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 571-72 & n.2 (1978)
(hiring from list including predominant number of whites did not constitute disparate
impact where overall hiring favored blacks); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 130, 138 (1976) (even though rule denying pregnant women benefits had impact
against them, no disparate impact discrimination found because total disability package
favored women); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93 (1973) (employer defended
disparate impact of no-alien rule by showing that persons employed were disproportion-
ately of Mexican ancestry); cf Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29
C.F.R § 1607.4C (1990) (federal enforcement agencies will in the usual case exercise
their administrative and prosecutorial discretion by not requiring employer to evaluate or
validate individual components of its selection process, and by not taking enforcement
action where employer has made proportional bottom-line selections).
296. The Teal Court explicitly rejected both the Fault Theory and its bottom-line de-
fense to claims of disparate impact discrimination because focus on the bottom line "con-
fuse[s] unlawful discrimination with discriminatory intent.... [And] resolution of the
factual question of intent is not what is at issue in this [disparate impact] case." Connect-
icut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454 (1982); accord Cox II, supra note 11, at 793 & n. 135;
Friedman, supra note 36, at 70.
297. See infra notes 314-320 and accompanying text (distinguishing this preference
from affirmative action measures).
298. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 459 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Massarsky v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 122 (3d Cir. 1983) (measuring disparate impact from
among those laid off, obscured disparate impact at an earlier step in process-eligibility
for lay-off); Arnold v. United States, 863 F.2d 994, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (career path
policy found generally to have no disparate impact, despite impact of one component
part).
299. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 460 (Powell, J., dissenting).
300. Cf EEOC v. Governor Mifflin School Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734, 744 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
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impact on the protected group as a whole to demonstrate whether the
employer has truly selected based on the facially neutral test, and not
based on a prohibited factor.3"' Thus, they would argue that the deter-
minative criterion was the test, not race, because the state promoted only
candidates who passed the test, but selected African-American candi-
dates from among those who passed the test at least in proportion to
their numbers in the applicant pool.
30 2
This focus on bottom-line selections would immunize a criterion, de-
spite its impact, when the employer's ultimate selections did not result in
adverse effect on the group. Based on that policy, the Fault Theorists
would also immunize a particular non-pass/fail criterion that adversely
impacts on a protected group30 3 if all the non-pass/fail criteria consid-
ered together resulted in no impact.3° The Fault Theory's emphasis on
equality at the bottom-line, to the exclusion of equality within the pro-
cess, fails to recognize the individual's Title VII right to equal considera-
tion for employment opportunities. °5
The Effects Theorists, on the other hand, recognize that a disparately
impacting criterion constitutes an unequal barrier to promotion and
would require the employer to justify it based solely on its disparate im-
pact, regardless of whether that barrier's effect is reflected at the bottom-
line. Similarly, a particular non-pass/fail criterion that disparately im-
pacts on a protected group hinders group members' employment oppor-
tunities even if the criterion is not by itself determinative.30 6 Only the
(finding no disparate impact discrimination where older workers received smaller in-
creases but also received the highest pay).
301. See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1337 ("An employer . . . engaged in
pretextual discrimination would not use both a test with adverse impact and an alfirma-
tive action program that entirely compensated for the adverse impact"); cf. Furnco Con-
str. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978) (bottom-line proportionality
undermines claims of intentional discrimination). But cf Blumrosen, supra note 45, at 92
(judge impact for compensatory justice to previously oppressed groups at bottom line);
Chamallas, supra note 59, at 344, 353-56 (evaluate group equal achievement goal of dis-
parate impact at bottom line).
302. Cf Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 1986)
(absent impact at bottom line, impact on white males of height maximum "does not limit
a male job applicant because of his sex, but because of his height").
303. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 463-64 n.8 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
304. Cf supra Section IIB2b (Fault Theory would limit proof of criterion's impact to
its impact on employer's actual workforce).
305. See Teal, 440 U.S. at 451.
306. See Palmer v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1544, 1547 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Wilmore v. City of
Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667, 668 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Friedman, supra note 36, at 71-72
(advocating judicial scrutiny of disparately impacting "nonautomatic barriers only when
such factors have a specifically calculable, nontrivial effect on the selection decision");
Chamallas, supra note 59, at 360 (concerns for judicial economy moderated by allowing
challenge to "all significant components" of non-pass/fail barriers); Note, Connecticut v.
Teal: Extending Griggs Beyond the Bottom Line, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 751, 768-70 (1983)
(describing competing arguments and concluding that "the greater the weight given to
the factor or factors with a disparate impact, the greater the likelihood that Teal will be
extended"); cf Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1396-98 (8th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing that critical factor for promotion "was not to be placed on the list, but to be
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Effects Theory ensures equality throughout the selection process, not just
at its conclusion.
A second consequence of the Fault Theory's bottom-line approach is
that it tends to group people based on their protected status, thus treating
individuals in each group as if they were fungible. 307 However, the fact
that the employer favors some members of a group provides no solace to
a group member eliminated or penalized by a non-neutral criterion.3 °3
From the harmed individual's perspective, the process is discriminatory
based on that individual's protected status.
Emphasis on the treatment of the group as a whole tends to deny Title
VII protection to subgroups: a criterion may disparately impact on the
protected group, but may ultimately harm only a subgroup.309 In Teal,
for example, the employer's bottom-line promotions ultimately excluded
only the subgroup of African-Americans who failed the test.3 1  From an
placed at a high standing on the list," court remanded for evaluation of disparate impact
from ranking, rather than pass/fail evaluation).
307. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 458-59 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); cf
Blumrosen, supra note 45, at 89 (disparate impact discrimination is fundamentally a
group right under causation theory); Blurarosen, The Group Interest Concept. Employ-
ment Discrimination, and Legislative Intent: The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 Harv.
J. on Legis. 99, 132-33 1983) (same); Chamallas, supra note 59, at 317 (same).
308. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 455; Friedman, supra note 36, at 67-68; Shoben, supra note
71, at 30; cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 341-42
(1977) (current non-discrimination does not remedy prior disparate treatment discrimi-
nation against different individuals).
309. Cf Blumrosen, The Concepts of Discrimination and the Teaching of Equal Em-
ployment Law, Remarks to AALS 1986, at 6 (advocating group rights theory and re-
jecting disparate impact absent homogeneity of group); Blumrosen, Interpreting the
ADEA: Intent or Impact, in Age Discrimination in Employment Act. A Compliance and
Litigation Manual for Lawyers and Personnel Practitioners 68, 104-05 (M. Lake ed. 1982)
(rejecting disparate impact analysis for ADEA because of diversity of interests within
protected group).
310. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 443-44; Cox I, supra note 11, at 64-65, 71-72.
Query whether focusing on protected groups in their entirety, as espoused by the Fault
Theory, would support the line of authority disallowing protection for members of sub-
groups composed of individuals within the intersection of two protected groups, such as
the subgroup of black women, who belong to groups defined by race and by sex. See
Robinson v. Adams, 830 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987); Degraffenreid v. General Motors
Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp.
770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986); cf Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351, 354-55 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring) (reserving tenure track positions for Jesuits, a sub-
group of Catholics, was not religious discrimination because both non-Catholics and non-
Jesuit Catholics would be similarly excluded); Lowe v. Commack Union Free School
Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1372-74 (2d Cir. 1989) (no discrimination where the employer's
hiring practices resulted in disproportionate exclusion of employees in the subgroup over
the age of fifty, rather than disproportionate exclusion of individuals over forty, the group
protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1470
(1990). An employer would defend a claim of disparate impact on such a subgroup by
arguing that it did not cause impact against either protected group-blacks or women.
Those seeking protection as a subgroup composed of the intersection of two protected
factors might avoid this dilemma by redefining that subgroup as a new protected group,
thereby challenging employment criteria for its disparate impact on the newly defined
protected group, black women. See, eg., Robinson, 830 F.2d at 134 (Pregerson, J., dis-
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Effects Theory perspective, however, that subgroup would be entitled to
Title VII protection against the employer's use of such a disparately im-
pacting criterion.31" ' Thus, absent business justification to support con-
tinued use of the test, the employer would be required to eliminate it and
to reconsider the credentials of the excluded subgroup. Only by accord-
ing subgroups protection will Title VII promote equality of employment
opportunities without regard to each individual's protected status.3 2
Emphasis on group treatment may also camouflage an employer's
preference for those members of the protected group who most resemble
members of the preferred group. For example, using a criterion that pre-
fers Euro-Americans to select among members of the disparately im-
senting) (pursuant to Teal, there is disparate impact against subgroup of black males);
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 944 n. 34, 949 (D. Neb. 1986) (dispa-
rate impact against black women allowed); cf. Jefferies v. Harris County Community
Action Ass'n., 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (disparate treatment against black
women cognizable under Title VII because absent "a clear expression by Congress that it
did not intend to provide protection against discrimination directed especially toward
black women as a class separate and distinct from the class of women and the class of
blacks, we cannot condone a result which leaves black women without a viable Title VII
remedy").
This "solution" raises the concern that disparate impact challenge based on a multi-
tude of protected groups "governed only by the mathematical principles of permutation
and combination, clearly raises the prospect of opening the hackneyed Pandora's box,"
Degraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145 (disparate treatment case); accord Lowe, 886 F.2d at
1373; Judge, 649 F. Supp. at 780. But see Scarborough, Conceptualizing Black Women's
Employment Experiences, 98 Yale L.J. 1457, 1477 n. 126 (1989) (challenges limited by the
necessity of proving a statistically significant impact); cf. supra Sections IIB2b & IIB2c
(discussing relevant populations and level of impact required for disparate impact dis-
crimination). Such a concern prompted one court to limit the redefinition to groups com-
posed of the intersection of only two protected categories. See Judge, 649 F. Supp. at
780; Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race and Sex in Employment
Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 793, 805-07 (1980). But see Scarborough, supra, at
1471-73 (criticizing Judge).
311. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-56 (1982); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co.,
811 F.2d 1119, 1128 (7th Cir. 1987); EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d 188, 196-97
(3d Cir. 1980) (Sloviter, J., dissenting); cf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S.
542, 544-48 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (where employer has hired men with pre-
school age children, refusal to hire women with pre-school age children constituted sex
discrimination under disparate treatment theory); Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d
1457, 1466-67 (6th Cir.) (age subgroup statistics should raise inference of disparate treat-
ment discrimination), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 211 (1990); McCorstin v. USX Corp., 621
F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing discrimination claim for subgroups within over-40
protected age group under disparate treatment theory); Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
464 F. Supp. 357, 366 (N.D. Ga. 1979) ("Because age is a relative rather than absolute
status when taken as a basis for discrimination, it need not follow that all persons pro-
tected by the Act should be grouped together for purposes of delineating the extent of
their protection.").
312. See, e.g., Robinson, 830 F.2d at 134 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (failure to employ a
single black male "is strong evidence that defendants have discriminated against black
males by creating an artificial barrier to their professional development, thereby frustrat-
ing Title VII's goals of achieving equality of opportunity"); Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585
F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) ("The duty not to discriminate is owed each minor-
ity employee, and discrimination against one of them is not excused by a showing the
employer did not discriminate against all of them.").
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pacted group-for example, African-Americans-tends to favor those
African-Americans who possess at least one characteristic that is more
prevalent among Euro-Americans than among African-Americans.
Those African-Americans who are most like Euro-Americans will be
preferred.313 Likewise, those group members who are most different
from the preferred group will be excluded from, or at least disadvantaged
in, the workplace with no regard for whether their group-based differ-
ences are in fact incompatible with success in the workplace. Under the
Effects Theory, however, both the underrepresented group members who
meet the standard of the preferred group as well as those who do not are
protected in their employment opportunities, unless their inability to
meet the standard interferes too drastically with the employer's ability to
run its business. That theory is more consistent with Title VII's antidis-
crimination mandates, which require equal treatment for all individuals.
In sum, only the Effects Theory promotes genuine, rather than formal or
token, diversity in the workplace.
Fault Theorists warn that evaluating disparate impact on a criterion-
by-criterion basis, rather than at the bottom line, will encourage quota
selections.314 It is the Fault Theory, however, not the Effects Theory,
that actually promotes quotas.3s 5 Where a selection process contains a
facially neutral factor that impacts on a particular group, the employer
can avoid justifying the criterion under the Fault Theory by selecting
among those who satisfy the criterion according to their protected status.
This is essentially a form of quota selection.316 But granting preferential
treatment to individuals or groups to overcome an imbalance in the em-
ployer's workforce is explicitly prohibited by Title VII. 317 Even if Title
VII did allow quota selections to remedy demonstrated disparate impact
in a selection process, however, using quotas to select from among those
who were already preferred by the adversely impacting criterion would
logically exacerbate the discrimination. Quota selections would only
remedy discrimination to the extent that employers used quotas to select
from among those penalized by the impacting criterion. 3 1  The Fault
313. See Cox I, supra note 11, at 74-75 & nn.172-173.
314. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 463 (Powell, J., dissenting).
315. See Shoben, supra note 71, at 31-32; cf Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1337 ("As a
limiting principle, Teal serves the salutary purpose of focusing the theory upon prevent-
ing pretextual discrimination, instead of encouraging preferential treatment.").
316. See Gold, supra note 19, at 460. Indeed, allowing an employer to defend either by
justifying the impact as a business necessity or by engaging in proportional hiring among
those who meet the employer's standards allows more discretion to the employer than
compelling justification for each criterion shown to have a disparate impact. See Chamal-
las, supra note 59, at 379. Allowing deference to the employer's discretion to run its
business is consistent with the Fault Theory. See infra notes 335-337 & 367 and accom-
panying text.
317. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988).
318. Cf Friedman, supra note 36, at 63, 71 (access theory requires employers affirma-
tively to aid members of previously discriminated groups to meet job qualifications).
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Theory, however, only recognizes those already preferred by the criterion
as eligible for selection.
Thus, the Fault Theory excuses a criterion that disparately impacts on
a protected group when the employer also engages in quota selections
from that group. Apparently, two wrongs do make a right.3 19 The Ef-
fects Theorists reject such a proposition.32
3. Business Necessity Response
Until an employee establishes a prima facie case by showing that the
employer's facially neutral criterion distinguishes between individuals
based on a prohibited characteristic, the employer is not required to offer
any explanation or justification for its use of the criterion. Under the
Effects Theory, the exclusive focus of the prima facie case is the dispa-
rately impacting consequences of the employer's selection practices. Jus-
tification is necessary once the employee establishes that one or more of
those practices creates a statistically significant barrier for members of a
protected class.32 x Under the Fault Theory, by contrast, an employer is
not required to justify a disparately impacting criterion unless the em-
ployee additionally proves that the employer used that criterion
unreasonably.322
Wherever the business necessity response is required,323 disparate im-
pact doctrine requires that the court evaluate whether the criterion is
sufficiently effective in achieving a business purpose to allow its contin-
ued use despite its impact on protected groups. 324 The two theories disa-
319. Adverse impact on a protected group coupled with quota preference for that
group, or adverse impact on a protected group coupled with preferential impact on that
group.
320. Indeed, the Teal decision clarified that the Effects Theory is more concerned with
neutrality in the selection process than with equal achievement by underrepresented
groups. Cf Blumrosen, supra note 45, at 103-07 (advocating causation theory); Chamal-
las, supra note 59, at 344, 353 (same). But cf Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15A(2)(a) (1990) (if bottom-line selection results in no im-
pact, an employer is not required to maintain records on impact of individual compo-
nents and their validity).
321. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 678 n.29 (1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1004 (1988) (Black-
mun, J., concurring); Caldwell, supra note 64, at 590-91; supra Sections IIB1 and IIB2.
322. See supra Sections IIB1 and IIB2. But cf. Note, supra note 45, at 129 n. 106 (de-
crying the circular reasoning that "[o]nly when the court employs a more exacting fit
standard, which it will do only once it has already determined the presence of discrimina-
tory intent, will it find impermissible legislative intent"); Ely, The Centrality and Limits
of Motivation Analysis, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1155, 1156-57 (1978) (suspect classification
doctrine intended to reveal unconstitutional motivation).
323. See supra notes 172-173 & 292 and accompanying text; supra notes 188 & 248.
324. Notwithstanding the various debates on business necessity, there is no debate
about the basic substantive standard for business necessity. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at
659-61; id. at 668-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting); The Civil Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 1, supra
note 14, at §§ 3-4; cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988) (BFOQ exception excuses only
"bona fide occupational qualification[s] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business").
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gree, however, on (i) the employer's evidentiary burden for proving
business necessity, (ii) the standard of judicial scrutiny for business ne-
cessity and (iii) the employee's rebuttal burden. These evidentiary dis-
putes over the business necessity response are currently being debated by
the Supreme Court and Congress.32
a. Evidentiary Disputes on Business Necessity
i. Burden of Proof
Whereas the Fault Theorists require the employer to bear only the
burden of production326 to prove business necessity,327 the Effects Theo-
rists require the employer to bear the additional burden of persuasion. 328
The dispute arises not from any misunderstanding of usual evidentiary
practices requiring the plaintiff to persuade on the violation of the law
and the defendant to persuade on any excuses or justification, 329 but
rather from the substantive debate on what constitutes a Title VII viola-
tion under the two theories.
Under the Fault Theory, the prima facie case of disparate impact
raises only the inference that the employer used its facially neutral crite-
rion pretextually in violation of Title VII. The business necessity re-
sponse rebuts that inference; its thrust is to establish the "innocence" of
employer's use of the criterion. Thus, the employer bears only the bur-
den of producing evidence to rebut the prima facie case,330 while the em-
ployees retain the burden of persuasion to prove the Title VII violation-
pretextual discrimination.
Under the Effects Theory, by contrast, the prima facie case of dispa-
325. See infra notes 327-328, 335, 347 & 351-355.
326. The burden of production requires that a party produce admissible evidence suffi-
cient to raise a genuine question of fact as to the issue, whereas the burden of persuasion
requires that the party persuade the fact finder on the issue. See Belton, Burdens of
Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Caser Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34
Vand. L. Rev. 1205, 1216 (1981).
327. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989); Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997-98 (1988) (plurality); New York City'
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 339-40 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
328. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 1, supra note 14, at §§ 3-4; Wards Cove,
490 U.S. at 668-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Watson, 487 U.S. at 1000-05 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47, 451 (1982); Beazer, 440 U.S. at
602 (White, J., dissenting); United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1111-12
(D.S.C. 1977) (three-judge district court decision), aff'd mem., 434 U.S. 1026 (1978);
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431-32 (1971).
329. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 669-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
330. See Gold, supra note 19, at 452-53, 593. The party seeking merely to rebut an
inference of discrimination traditionally bears only the burden of production. See Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-58 & n.9 0981); Cox II, supra
note 11, at 785 ("borrowing the allocation of proof from disparate treatment precedent
... reinforces the point that the plurality [in Watson] seeks to confine impact theory to a
suspected disparate treatment theory").
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rate impact itself establishes the Title VII violation. The business neces-
sity response therefore seeks not to rebut that violation, but to excuse or
justify it. It constitutes an affirmative defense to limit the employer's
liability.331 Thus, the employer bears the burden of persuasion on busi-
ness necessity.332
ii. Standard of Scrutiny
At the business necessity stage, the court considers the employer's le-
gitimate discretion to operate its business. Thus, there is no dispute over
the substantive content of the business necessity response: the dispa-
rately impacting criterion must be shown to be effective in achieving the
employer's legitimate business purpose.333 There is dispute, however, on
the standard of judicial scrutiny required for this business necessity
response.
Under the Fault Theory, an employer need only offer evidence 334 that
its use of the criterion was rationally related to accomplishing a reason-
able business purpose.335 Thus, courts have excused tests that dispropor-
tionately exclude members of a protected group based on evidence of the
tests' positive correlation with training programs, without requiring fur-
ther proof of any relationship between job training and job perform-
ance.336 Under such a light standard, the employer seeks to undercut the
331. See Blumrosen, supra note 45, at 80.
332. The party affirmatively defending against an established violation of law tradition-
ally bears the burden of persuasion.
333. See supra note 324.
334. See supra Section IIB3a(i).
335. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (criteria
must "serve[] in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer");
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality) (criterion must
be "based on legitimate business reasons"); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568, 587 & n.31 (1979) (Court excused blanket application of no-methadone rule
even though only more specific application of the rule was found rational by the district
court); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 339-40 (1977) (arguments of counsel, rather
than evidence, might establish some correlation between criterion and job sufficient for
business necessity) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247,
250-52 (1976) (applying rational basis standard after articulating stricter standard); Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (pre-employment tests must be
"fairly related to the job skills or work characteristics desired") (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); cf United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1107-09 (D.S.C. 1977),
aff'd mem., 434 U.S. 1026 (1978) (articulating rational basis standard but applying
stricter standard).
336. See, e.g., South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. at 1112-13 (certifying teachers based on
achieving a minimum score on the disparately impacting National Teacher's Examina-
tion was allowed because success on the exam correlated with mastery of teacher training
programs); cf. Washington, 426 U.S. at 250-51 (positive correlation between city's quali-
fying test and training program test results served to justify the qualifying test).
This standard for business necessity has been questioned on two grounds. First, dis-
senting justices have questioned the sufficiency of the employer's purpose for using the
disparately impacting criterion to predict or confirm mastery of job training, rather than
job performance. See United States v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026, 1027-28 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting); Washington, 426 U.S. at 266-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf Al-
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inference that the criterion was a pretext for discrimination based on the
individual's protected status. 37 The focus of business necessity under
this theory, like the focus during the prima facie case, is on the em-
ployer's unreasonableness or fault in using the criterion.
Under the Effects Theory, however, the employer must justify the cri-
terion by a sufficiently compelling business purpose to overcome the dis-
criminatory effects established by the prima facie case.338 This is
consistent with that theory's interpretation of business necessity as an
affirmative defense.339
Ultimately, setting the appropriate balance between equal employment
opportunity and business needs is a legislative judgment' Although
Congress did not adopt an explicit business necessity standard, it did cre-
ate the bona fide occupational qualification (the "BFOQ") ' exception
as an affirmative defense to disparate treatment discrimination in some
circumstances.3 2 That exception may provide a model for calibrating
Title VII's balance between equal employment opportunity and business
needs for disparate impact discrimination.34 3 The BFOQ excuses an em-
ployer from disparate treatment liability where its use of religion, sex or
national origin actually "is a bona fide occupational qualification," 3 "
bemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 431 (employer must show relationship to important elements
ofjob performance). These justices have also questioned the effectiveness of the criterion
to achieve the employer's purpose where the evidence established only the correlation
between the qualifying exam and training exams. See South Carolina, 434 U.S. at 1027-
28 (White, J., dissenting); Washington, 426 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
337. See Cox I, supra note 11, at 96-97; Gold, supra note 19, at 589-93. But see
Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1320-26 (balancing impact against business needs uncovers
pretextual discrimination); cf Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards
Cove Packing Ca. v. Atonio, 17 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 1, 42 ("The stronger the presumption of
improper motive, the heavier the employer's burden to refute the presumption
becomes.").
338. See Cox I, supra note 11, at 96-97.
339. See supra Section IIB3a(i).
340. Cf. Gold, supra note 19, at 457, 464 (recognizing difficulty in setting balance be-
tween business efficiency and equal employment opportunity). But see Willborn, supra
note 11, at 824-25 (business necessity standard correlated to level of impact).
341. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988); supra note 127.
342. By its language, the BFOQ exception is limited in scope. It provides a defense to
only those disparate treatment actions challenging an employer's practice of hiring and
employing on the basis of sex, religion or national origin. It would not excuse an em-
ployer's disparate treatment for such other employer practices as discrimination in com-
pensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment; limiting, segregating or
classifying employees or applicants; otherwise adversely affecting an employee's status as
an employee, and perhaps discharge. Nor would it excuse an employer's disparate treat-
ment based on race or color. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
343. See supra Perry, supra note 77, passim.
344. See eg., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 & n.5 (5th
Cir. 1969) (employer must establish either "that all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved" or in the case
where "it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with women [or other protected
groups] on an individualized basis," that the selection criterion is reasonable); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1977) (BFOQ established where female applicants'
"very womanhood" directly reduced their ability to maintain order in a male, maximum-
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and where its purpose for using those criteria is "reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that . . .business. ' 345 Thus, when the em-
ployer's cost of achieving equal employment opportunity burdens the es-
sence of the business, equal employment opportunity must be
subordinated.
Consistent with Congress' BFOQ standard, the Effects Theorists have
settled on a balance between discriminatory effects and business needs
that is even more conservative: they would excuse the use of a non-neu-
tral criterion only where the criterion is necessary to the employer's busi-
ness, as evidenced by a showing346 that the criterion is substantially
effective in achieving an important business purpose347 that cannot be
security prison where inmates were not classified or segregated by offense or level of
dangerousness); id. at 343-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (adopting the majority's standard
but challenging its use of gender stereotype as a substitute for factual support).
345. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (the
airline failed to establish the BFOQ exception because even the proved inability of men to
perform the non-mechanical functions of the flight cabin attendant job was merely "tan-
gential" to the essence of the airline's business-the safe transportation of passengers);
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334-35 (BFOQ established to require male correctional officers for
maximum-security male prisons because their ability to maintain order in the prisons was
the "essence of a correctional officer's job" and was clearly essential to the functioning of
the prison). Thus, the BFOQ defense requires "a business necessity test, not a business
convenience test." Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.
346. See supra Section IIB3a(i).
347. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 1, supra note 14, at § 3 ("The term
'required by business necessity' means-(A) in the case of employment practices involv-
ing selection (such as hiring... ), the practice.., must bear a significant relationship to
successful performance of the job; or (B) in the case of employment practices that do not
involve selection, the practice.. must bear a significant relationship to a significant busi-
ness objective of the employer"); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 671
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (business necessity standard is substantial burden to meet);
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1005-10 (1988) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) (criteria must be "necessary to fulfill legitimate business requirement"); Con-
necticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47, 451 (1982) (disparately impacting examination
must be justified by proof that it measures "skills related to effective performance"
needed for job at issue); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 602
(1979) (White, J., dissenting) (business necessity requires proof that criterion "results in a
higher quality labor force, [and] that such a labor force is necessary"); United States v.
South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026, 1027-28 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (relationship to
training, rather than job performance, insufficient for business necessity); Dothard, 433
U.S. at 329, 331 n.14 (business necessity requires employer to prove the criteria are "nec-
essary to safe and efficient job performance"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 264-69
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (business necessity requires proof of job relationship);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) ("discriminatory tests are im-
permissible unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be 'predictive of or
significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are
relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated' ") (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4 (1990)); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (to establish
business necessity, company must show that its criteria "had a manifest relationship to
the employment in question" or bore "a demonstrable relationship to successful perform-
ance of the jobs for which they were used"). Just as the issue of disparate impact discrim-
ination focuses on the criterion itself-"Is it neutral?"-the business necessity response
also focuses on the criterion-"Is it necessary?" But see Willborn, supra note 11, at 824-
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accomplished by a lesser-impacting alternative criterion.34 For exam-
ple, tests that exclude a disproportionate number of protected group
members would only be excused based on professionally acceptable evi-
dence of the test's ability to predict successful job performance." 9
iii. Lesser Impacting Alternatives
Employees may counter a successful business necessity response by
showing that an alternative criterion with less impact would also accom-
plish the employer's business purpose.350 Previous distinctions between
the two theories on the business necessity response inform their different
approaches to an appropriate rebuttal standard.
To rebut business necessity under the Fault Theory, the employees
must establish that the employer used the disparately impacting crite-
rion, rather than an alternative resulting in less impact, as a pretext for
intentional discrimination. 351  The lesser-impacting alternative must be
equally effective and no more costly in accomplishing the business pur-
pose.352 Otherwise, the cost and effectiveness differentials would reason-
25 (correlate business necessity standard to level of impact to identify standards that are
insufficiently productive to overcome their disparate impact).
348. See infra Section IIB3a(iii).
349. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 431; Gillespie v. State of Wisconsin, 771 F.2d
1035, 1043-45 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 0986); Contreras v. City of Los
Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1280-85 (9th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1021 0982).
350. See Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1263 n.10 (6th Cir.
1981); cf Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554, 1559 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Be-
cause the Home failed to establish job-relatedness, we need not examine alternatives or
pretext.").
351. See, eg. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660-61 (1989) (refusal
to use a lesser impacting alternative "belie[s] a claim by petitioners that their incumbent
practices are being employed for non-discriminatory reasons"); New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) ("express finding that the rule was not moti-
vated by racial animus forecloses any claim in rebuttal that it was merely a pretext for
intentional discrimination"); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)
(alternatives "would be evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a 'pre-
text' for discrimination"); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224,
264-65 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (failure to use equally effective alternative with lesser impact
suggests pretext); Friedman, supra note 59, at 14-15 ("If an alternative.., is both effi-
cient and less discriminatory, the... failure to adopt it probably was motivated by a
desire to retain the discriminatory aspect of the original requirement."); Furnish, A Path
Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 419, 424-25 0982)
(interpreting Beazer to limit use of alternatives proof to establishing intent); Maltz, supra
note 15, at 352 & n.38 (same); Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1327 (employer's proof of no
alternatives would overcome suggestion of pretext); cf Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988) (alternatives would also be relevant as "functional
equivalent[s] of a pretext for" intentional discrimination); Lamber, Alternatives to Chal-
lenged Employee Selection Criteria" The Significance of Nonstatistical Evidence in Dispa-
rate Impact Cases Under Title VII, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 6 (one use of alternatives is to
raise issue of intent).
352. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661; Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (plurality); United
States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp 1094, 1115-16 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd mem., 434 U.S.
1026 (1978); cf Beazer, 440 U.S. at 590 & n.33 (recognizing proof of alternative to chal-
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ably justify using the challenged criterion. Moreover, because
demonstrating pretext is the essence of a Title VII violation to the Fault
Theorists, the employees would bear the burden of persuasion on the
rebuttal issue.353
In order to rebut business necessity under the Effects Theory, however,
the employees must produce evidence challenging the assertion that the
employer needed to use this criterion, rather than a lesser impacting al-
ternative, to accomplish its business purpose.35 4 Evidence that the lesser
impacting alternative was less effective or more costly would balance into
the evaluation of whether the employer's use of the disparately impacting
alternative was justified in light of its greater discriminatory effects.355
Because the employer is ultimately responsible for proving the affirma-
tive defense of business necessity, the employees bear only the burden of
production to rebut the employer's proof of business necessity. 5 6
lenge rationality of disparately impacting no-methadone rule under Constitution; but re-
quiring proof that alternative works "as cheaply and effectively").
353. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (plurality); id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425.
354. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Dothard, 433
U.S. at 332 (lesser impacting alternative of testing strength directly undercut business
necessity of challenged height and weight standards); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595
F.2d 1367, 1383 (9th Cir. 1979) ("So long as non-discriminatory alternatives serve the
legitimate interests of the police in safe and efficient job performance, police departments
cannot pursue policies that require the use of selection standards that are themselves
prima facie violations of Title VII."); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 &
n.7, 799-800 (4th Cir. 1971) ("[A] practice is hardly 'necessary' if an alternative practice
better effectuates the intended purpose or is equally effective but less discriminatory.");
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 1, supra note 14, at § 4 ("except that an employment
practice ... demonstrated to be required by business necessity shall be unlawful where a
complaining party demonstrates that a different employment practice. . with less dispa-
rate impact would serve the respondent as well"); Bartholet, supra note 69, at 1023-26
(requiring adoption of lesser impacting alternatives despite validity of employer's crite-
rion); Caldwell, supra note 64, at 601 (employees may prove "reasonable alternatives to
the challenged practice without putting the defendant's state of mind in issue"); Taub &
Williams, supra note 70, at 843 (alternatives are useful both to explore lesser impacting
options and to "expose and help overcome the possibly unconsciously-made, yet biased
assumptions that underlie exclusionary practices"); cf Beazer, 440 U.S. at 590 & n.33
(using alternatives to challenge rationality of disparately impacting methadone rule under
Constitution); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 339-40 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part) (alternative
of requiring appearance of strength rather than actual strength might have been found a
business necessity); Lamber, supra note 351, at 6-7 (stating several uses of alternative
proof).
355. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1006 (1988) (Blackmun,
J., concurring); see also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 602 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting) (cost of alternative must be "prohibitive"); Chambers v. Omaha
Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 709 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[a]dministrative inconvenience is not
a sufficient justification for not utilizing these less discriminatory alternatives"); Zuniga v.
Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1982) (inconvenience of finding
temporary replacement insufficient to reject leave of absence alternative, rather than ter-
mination, notwithstanding business necessity of fetal vulnerability rule).
356. Cf Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (em-
ployer bears only burden of production to rebut inference of disparate treatment; employ-
ees bear burden of persuasion on issue of intent); Uniform Guidelines on Employee
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b. Consequences of the Business Necessity Distinctions
Whereas the Fault Theory permits an employer to use a disparately
impacting criterion unless there is no rational business purpose to sup-
port it, the Effects Theory permits its use only if such use is necessary for
the business. More than any other difference between the two theories,
this dispute over the evidentiary contours of the business necessity re-
sponse highlights the limitations of the Fault Theory in accomplishing
Title VII's objectives.
To successfully establish discrimination under the Fault Theory, em-
ployees must prove that the employer's articulated purpose is illegitimate
or that the criterion is unrelated to achieving that purpose.3 " Although
in that instance the inference of pretextual discrimination is properly
reasserted, the Fault Theory's acceptance of a rational business purpose
as a business necessity that undercuts pretext is based on a false prem-
ise.35 Even explicit use of prohibited factors can be supported by ra-
tional business purposes.35 9 For example, in City of Los Angeles
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3B (1990) (employer must use reasonable efforts
to explore alternatives).
357. By this lenient standard, courts have found discrimination and rejected employ-
ers' business necessity defense only in extreme cases. See eg., Green v. USX Corp., 896
F.2d 801, 805 (3d Cir.) (finding unreasonable employer's bald assertion that its subjective
evaluation process enabled company to identify the "best qualified" candidates for un-
skilled positions), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 53 (1990); Nash v. City of Jacksonville, 837
F.2d 1534, 1537 (11th Cir. 1988) (evidence that qualified city employees drafted test was
legally insufficient to establish business necessity, particularly where drafter admitted he
did not evaluate exam as it related to job performance), vacated and remanded, 490 U.S.
1103 (1989), reinstated, 905 F.2d 355 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.LW. 3562
(1991); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 52 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 39,537, at 60,499
(E.D.N.C. 1989) (rejecting as unreasonable conclusory assertion that subjective assess-
ments were rationally related to hiring best qualified candidates); Richardson v. Lamar
County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp. 806, 825 (M.D. Ala. 1989) ("A court should find a
test invalid only if the evidence reflects that the test falls so far below acceptable and
reasonable minimum standards that the test could not be reasonably understood to do
what it purports to do," as was the case at bar); EEOC v. Andrew Corp., 51 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 39,364, at 59,541-42 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (word-of-mouth recruiting from ex-
clusively white clerical staff was not justified by cost or "inevitability," particularly where
employer encouraged such recruiting and where employer affirmatively advertised in
newspapers aimed at white markets, ignoring newspapers aimed at black markets). In-
deed, the Seventh Circuit twice remanded cases for the lower court to redetermine busi-
ness necessity based on a record virtually devoid of any rational business justification for
the disparately impacting criterion. See, e.g., Evans v. City of Evanston, 881 F.2d 382,
384-85 (7th Cir. 1989) (lower court found city's effort to justify cut-off point as "feeble,"
"consist[ing] of little more than testimony that one standard deviation above the mean is
a frequent cut-off point on tests"); Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 380-81 (7th Cir. 1989)
(evidence demonstrated that employer was reckless, even irrational, in using exclusionary
test).
358. Se e.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 264-65
(N.D. Tex. 1980) (rational business factors can be used pretextually where the employer
either (i) places heavier emphasis on factor than productivity concerns requires or (ii)
uses a more impacting alternative); supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
359. See Section 703(e)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988); supra notes
344-345.
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Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,3 6" the City explicitly re-
quired women to make larger contributions than men to the pension
fund361 to achieve its rational business purpose of accounting for the fact
that the cost for the average female retiree exceeds that of the average
male retiree.362 Moreover, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc.,363 the airline excluded men from its flight attendant positions be-
cause its passengers "overwhelmingly preferred to be served by female
stewardesses."' 3 " These rational explanations failed, not as a factual
matter but as a matter of law, to excuse the disparate treatment discrimi-
nation at issue in Manhart and Diaz.365 Consequently, allowing such ra-
tional explanations to excuse disparate impact discrimination as a matter
of law falls short of even the limited goals of the Fault Theory: it pro-
tects some pretextual or explicit use of prohibited criteria.366
Only when the employer's use of a disparately impacting criterion is
not even in its interests will the employer be required to change its prac-
tices under that theory. Therefore, the balance between discretion for
business and equal employment opportunity drastically favors
business.367
Under the Effects Theory, by contrast, the employer bears more re-
sponsibility for changing workplace standards that are proved to be non-
neutral and unnecessary. Forbidding unnecessary disparately impacting
criteria is not overinclusive of the theory's goals. Rather, because of the
business necessity defense, it is underinclusive: only unnecessary non-
neutral criteria are forbidden.368
Fault Theorists support their more lenient standard of scrutiny by ar-
guing that it reduces the incentive for employers to avoid their justifica-
tion obligation by resorting to quota selections. 369 Indeed, President
Bush's opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1990 was prompted in part
360. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
361. Women's larger contribution for the same benefits resulted in discrimination in
women's pay. See id. at 705.
362. See id. at 708-09. Moreover, the city could not judge at the funding stage which
women would outlive which men. See id.
363. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
364. Id. at 387.
365. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711
(1978); Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389.
366. See Bartholet, supra note 69, at 991-96; Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1310-11;
Willborn, supra note 11, at 818-21.
367. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988) (plurality)
("We do not believe that disparate impact theory need have any chilling effect on legiti-
mate business practices.").
368. The business necessity defense, therefore, provides limits for the Effects Theory.
See supra note 81. But cf. Friedman, supra note 36, at 68 (business necessity allows
employers to use criteria that deny access).
369. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989); Watson, 487
U.S. at 991-94 & n.2, 998-99 (plurality); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 463 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Black-
mun, J., concurring in judgment); Gold, supra note 19, at 457-63; Rutherglen, supra note
36, at 1313-16, 1326-27.
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by concern with quota selections.37°
The charge that a more searching standard of business necessity will
result in quotas, however, is unwarranted. As an initial matter, although
the Effects Theory's standard of scrutiny for business necessity justifica-
tion is heavier than that of the Fault Theory,37' it is lighter than the well-
accepted BFOQ justification under disparate treatment doctrine. 372
Moreover, an employer raises doubt as to the necessity of its job prereq-
uisites by selecting lower-ranked individuals from underrepresented
groups rather than justifying the merits of the criteria. In that circum-
stance, it would be more consistent with Title VII to encourage the em-
ployer to forego use of the disparately impacting criteria to which it is so
tenuously committed.
On a more concrete level, this specter of quotas has proved illusory.
Although the Effects Theorists' standard had been the law of business
necessity for almost two decades prior to Wards Cove, employers did not
resort to quotas. 37 3 In actuality, an employer exposes itself to more lia-
bility by engaging in preferential treatment of protected group members
to overcome the exclusionary impact of its criterion. Once the em-
ployer's actions are detected, the employer would still be required to jus-
tify its disparately impacting criterion 374 and it might also be subject to
370. Civil Rights Act Wins House and Senate Approval, 396 Lab. L. Rpts. (CCH) fl 3
(August 7, 1990); see supra note 14.
The 102d Congress has introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a bill containing perti-
nent language that is identical to that vetoed by President Bush. See H.R. 1, supra note
14, at §§ 3-4.
371. See supra Section IIB3a(ii).
372. See supra notes 341-345 and accompanying text.
Similarly, to avoid liability under the Fault Theory of disparate impact, the employer
must articulate a rational business purpose, whereas to avoid liability in pretextual dispa-
rate treatment cases, the employer must only articulate a non-discriminatory reason, re-
gardless of its rationality. Compare supra note 335 and accompanying text (employer's
criterion must be rational to justify use of disparately impacting criterion) with Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981) (employer's expla-
nation must be non-discriminatory, i.e. not based on race, color, religion, sex or national
origin, to undercut inference of subjective intent). Cf. Irchirl v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 50
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 38,941, at 57,070, 57,071 (S.D. Tex. 1989) ("Title VII does not
protect employees from the arbitrary employment policies and practices of their em-
ployer, only their discriminatory application or impact"); Manuel v. WSBT, Inc., 706 F.
Supp. 654, 661 (N.D. Ind. 1988) ("[t]hat an employer's personnel decision was ill-in-
formed or mistaken does not establish that it was a pretext for discrimination"); Dadino
v. Delaware River Port Auth., 703 F. Supp. 331, 349 (D.N.J. 1988) (existence of confes-
sion undercuts subjective intent); Grimes v. District of Columbia, 630 F. Supp. 1065,
1070 (D.D.C. 1986) (clerical error undercuts subjective intent), vac. on other grounds, 836
F.2d 647, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
373. Since 1965, the unemployment rate for people of color was consistently almost
double the overall average rate whereas the white unemployment rate was consistently
below the overall average rate. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bull.
2340, Handbook of Labor Statistics Table 26 (1989). For example, during 1988 the overall
unemployment rate for all civilian workers was 5.5%, for black workers 11.7%, for His-
panic workers 8.2% and for white workers 4.7%. See id
374. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982); supra Section IIB2d.
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liability for reverse discrimination.375 Finally, when molding the con-
tours of disparate impact doctrine, giving too much consideration to
whether those regulated will be encouraged to circumvent their obliga-
tions seems an inappropriate policy.3 7
6
Requiring thorough scrutiny of an employer's disparately impacting
qualifications is justified 37 7 to avoid allowing facially benign differences
to achieve social significance unrelated to their merits. Differences be-
tween protected groups are not the problem; society's use of those differ-
ences is.a7a For example, that women are, on average, shorter than men
prevents them from reaching the instrument panel on airplanes only be-
cause those airplanes were designed to accommodate the measurements
of the average Euro-American man. 3 79 Similarly, where effective job per-
formance is defined in terms of current performance 380 or in terms of
stereotyped characteristics, 38 ' then it is the status quo or stereotypes
rather than true business needs that purport to justify continued exclu-
sion of protected groups. 382 In the airplane design example, employees
could rebut the necessity of the height requirement by suggesting adjusta-
ble seats383 as a more neutral alternative to accomplish the employer's
375. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640-42 (1987) (voluntary
preferential treatment permitted only when restrictions on its purpose and means are
strictly followed); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979) (same);
Shoben, supra note 37, at 241-42 (same).
376. Indeed, the most effective way to discourage employers from resorting to quota
selections would be to repeal Title VII.
377. Cf International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 903 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (disparate treatment case) ("If the defense of bona
fide occupational qualification were broadly construed-for example, to excuse all sex
discrimination that the employer could show was cost-justified-very little sex discrimi-
nation in employment ... would be forbidden. Title VII's reach would be shortened
drastically."), rev'd on other grounds, 59 U.S.L.W. 4209 (1991).
378. See Littleton, supra note 83, at 1284-85; Segal, supra note 36, at 129-30; cf. Wil-
liams, supra note 71, at 357 ("The focus in the pregnancy debate, as with men and women
or blacks and whites, should be on whether the differences should be deemed relevant in
the context of particular employment rules.").
379. See Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, 419 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Taub, supra
note 73, at 1694 (citing C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case
of Sex Discrimination 181-82 (1979)); Taub & Williams, supra note 70, at 839; Note,
Getting Women Work that Isn't Women's Work" Challenging Gender Bias in the Work-
place under Title VII, 97 Yale L.J. 1397, 1398-99 (1987); cf Note, supra note 84, at 494-
99 (BFOQ in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 0977), justified by illegal conditions at
prison; gender-based extension of time for promotion justified based on gender-based
combat exclusion in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (975); upholding jury system
requiring men to opt out but allowing women to volunteer based on stereotyped notion of
women's role in the home in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 0961)).
380. See Bartholet, supra note 69, at 1008-23; Note, supra note 379, at 1398-99.
381. See Cox II, supra note 11, at 777-78 (using example where aggressiveness is linked
to leadership in the employer's understanding of the job at issue, thereby requiring ag-
gressiveness as qualification for effective job performance).
382. See Littleton, supra note 83, at 1306-08 (feminists criticize tendency to locate the
difference in women, rather than in the institution).
383. Cf Littleton, supra note 83, at 1314 (adjustable podiums); Williams, supra note
71, at 374-80 (evaluating costs of restructuring).
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interest in safe and effective job performance. 3 Requiring the employer
to demonstrate its criteria to be substantially more effective than alterna-
tives in achieving genuine business needs, rather than requiring mere ar-
ticulation of rational business reasons for the criteria, more readily
exposes the unwarranted bias. Only when equal employment opportu-
nity is given priority over business convenience,'8 5 which in many cases
masks discriminatory bias, will America's promise of equal employment
opportunity extend to all capable participants, even those who are
different.
Adopting the Effects Theory's business necessity standard, rather than
the Fault Theory's standard, would require an employer to abandon its
selection criterion only when the criterion is found to be merely ration-
ally effective, but not substantially effective, in achieving the employer's
purpose or when the employer's purpose is found to be only rationally
related, but not important, to the business. Both the cost of foregoing
this margin of productivity and the marginal cost of justifying the crite-
rion at this higher level are justified. Indeed, if it did not accord priority
to equal employment opportunity over business concerns, Title VII
would fail in its objective of changing the status quo to equalize employ-
ment opportunities for previously underrepresented groups excluded by
both purposeful and institutional discrimination.3" 6
4. Summary
As this Article has demonstrated, the Fault Theory focuses on em-
ployer fault throughout the entire disparate impact case. This emphasis
has serious ramifications. Its fundamental drawback is that it evaluates
discrimination solely from the perspective of the employer-ignoring the
perspectives of the employee/applicant and society3 87 -thus diverting at-
tention from the harmful effects of disparately impacting criteria.388
Moreover, it singles out for prohibition only a limited form of discrimi-
natory conduct from the more expansive, and indistinguishable, range of
discrimination.38 9 Equally important, the Fault Theory equates fault
384. See Taub & Williams, supra note 70, at 843; cf Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp.,
733 F. Supp. 344, 362-63 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (no injunctive relief and liability limited where
employer already implemented a lesser impacting system).
385. Cf Littleton, supra note 83, at 1301-02 (recognizing need for radical challenge to
male bias in institutions).
386. See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text; Perry, supra note 77, at Section
IIC3.
387. See D. Bell, supra note 85, at 659; Freedman, supra note 83, at 965-68; Freeman,
supra note 71, at 1075; Minow, supra note 144, at 76-82; Segal, supra note 36, at 139-40,
Taub & Williams, supra note 70, at 838 n.52.
388. Those harms are felt by both the immediate victims of discrimination, the groups
victimized and society. Those harms include not just lack of money, power and dignity
for those excluded, but also decreased efficiency from preferential distribution of human
talent and decreased creativity from the failure to respect diverse perspectives. See Mi-
now, supra note 144, at 77 (goal is equal respect, not sympathy or empathy).
389. See, e.g., D. Bell, supra note 85, at 659 (Under fault-based theories, "[a]cts of
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
with responsibility. 390 Not only does this legitimize the status quo,391 but
it immunizes those with the power and the obligation under Title VII to
substitute equality for that discriminatory status quo.392
The Effects Theory's emphasis, on the other hand, more appropriately
addresses Title VII's concerns.393 Throughout the prima facie case of
disparate impact, the focus remains on the criterion's disparate impact
discrimination are not deemed a social phenomenon, [rather they are defined to include]
only the misguided conduct of misguided individuals whose bad acts prevent the system
of equality of opportunity from distributing the rewards of life to the deserving, and
depriving only those who lack sufficient merit."); Freeman, supra note 71, at 1103 (defin-
ing discrimination as the "occasional aberrational practice" while ignoring "racial
powerlessness, poverty, and unemployment"); Lawrence, supra note 41, at 328, 356-61
(recognizing discrimination to include all actions "to which the culture attaches racial
significance"); Friedman, supra note 36, at 57 ("emphasis on fault" does not redress em-
ployer's use of facially neutral devices that result in discriminatory effects attributable to
historical discrimination); Friedman, supra note 59, at 22 ("But this postulate incorrectly
assumes that the discriminatory consequences of a facially neutral practice are less offen-
sive that discrimination generated by a hostile motive. Equally undesirable societal costs
result from both intentional and unintentional discrimination. Whatever the cause, dif-
ferential treatment, and the diminished contact among the races that it engenders, rein-
forces prejudices and stereotypes, creates feelings of inferiority and superiority, deprives
individuals of important benefits, perpetuates fear and hostility, and impedes understand-
ing and cooperation.")
390. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 41, at 325-26 ("Understanding the cultural source
of our racism obviates the need for fault, as traditionally conceived, without denying our
collective responsibility for racism's eradication."); Freeman, supra note 71, at 1055
("The fault concept gives rise to a complacency about one's own moral status; it creates a
class of 'innocents' who need not feel any personal responsibility for the conditions asso-
ciated with discrimination, and who therefore feel great resentment when called upon to
bear any burdens in connection with remedying violations."); Friedman, supra note 36, at
55 ("To... immunize employers on the basis of individual blamelessness from any re-
sponsibility for changing the status quo, would have fatally impaired the effort at break-
ing this cycle of disadvantage."); D. Bell, supra note 85, at 657 ("President Johnson
suggested that the priority in the effort to eliminate the effects of racism should be placed
on providing remediation, not determining responsibility. This was the thrust of cases
like Brown and Griggs, but more recent cases such as Washington v. Davis, . . . have
reversed the remediation-responsibility concerns."); Hochschild, Equal Opportunity and
the Estranged Poor, 501 Annals 150 (Jan. 1989) ("Political choices ranging from slavery
to a preference for unemployment over inflation in the context of a particular ideological
framework helped to create a group of people with no resources, no skills, and no faith.").
391. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 85, at 110 ("what would be in the interest of the
ruling classes would be to 'bourgeoisify' a sufficient number of minority people in order to
transform them into active, visible legitimators of the underlying and basically unchanged
social structure"); Freeman, supra note 71, at 1113-14 (to the extent some minorities
succeed, it will shift the blame for continued minority underrepresentation from discrimi-
nation to the victims).
392. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 144, at 77 ("We can and should confront our involve-
ment in and responsibility for what happens when we act in a reality we did not invent
but still have latitude to discredit or affirm."); Finley, supra note 83, at 1171 ("I choose
the term 'responsibility' because the fact of interconnection between people and between
various aspects of our lives such as work and home give each of us a measure of responsi-
bility for how our actions or failures to act affect others."); see also Littleton, supra note
83, at 1317-18 ("[A] few men who are at or near the top of intersecting hierarchies of sex,
race, and class... [have] the power to set the terms by which all forms of human activity
are given social meaning and social value.").
393. See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text.
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because evaluating a criterion's disproportionate effects most objectively
identifies group-based barriers to employment opportunities. Moreover,
by shifting the focus at the business necessity stage to the employer's
business justification for the criterion, the Effects Theory attempts to ef-
fect the remedial purpose of Title VII while respecting legitimate busi-
ness prerogatives.
The full impact of the distinctions between the Fault and the Effects
Theories has been obscured by the state of the law under Title VII. Cur-
rent disparate impact doctrine includes evidentiary choices consistent
with both theories. The Appendix summarizes the evidentiary contours
of both theories and the current state of the law regarding those contours
under Title VII.
CONCLUSION
The time has come to articulate a complete theory of disparate impact
discrimination. Regardless of whether Congress reverses the Supreme
Court's recent rulings, some fundamental evidentiary issues remain to be
resolved. To achieve a coherent Title VII theory of disparate impact dis-
crimination it will be necessary both to resolve these remaining issues
and to conform inconsistent evidentiary rulings to one theory of discrimi-
nation. This will necessarily require a choice between the two competing
theories.
The substantive distinction between the Fault and Effects Theories is
that the Fault Theory allows the employer to use disparately impacting
criteria absent employer fault, whereas the Effects Theory prohibits the
employer from using disparately impacting criteria unless demanded by
its business. As this Article has demonstrated, the consequences of that
distinction are enormous.
The goals and evidentiary contours of the Fault Theory'91 reveal it to
require little change in the nation's workplace standards. The theory
presumes the nondiscriminatory nature of all workplace standards, ex-
cept those few that are proved to be explicitly or pretextually based on
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Consequently, the makeup of
the workforce will not be significantly altered, either in terms of partici-
pation by underrepresented groups or in terms of the perspectives of
those group members allowed to participate. Without significant institu-
tional changes, only the individuals from underrepresented groups who
most resemble those who have already succeeded under the status quo
will achieve equal employment opportunities.
The goals and evidentiary contours of the Effects Theory,395 by con-
trast, indicate that it would expose discrimination in many more facially
neutral workplace standards. It would ensure that those standards either
accommodate the perspectives of all workers, not just Euro-American
394. See supra Section II.
395. See id
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males, or be truly job-related. As a consequence, meritocracy will be-
come more of a reality and real diversity, not just formal or token diver-
sity, will be a possibility in the nation's workplace.
Absent Congressional mandate compelling adoption of the more re-
stricted Fault Theory, the Effects Theory should be adopted because it
fulfills the goal of equal employment opportunity in a manner more con-
sistent with Congress' mandates in Title VII.
DISPARATE IMPACT
APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF COMPARISON OF EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Evidentiary Issues
Fault Theory
Effects Theory
1. Facially Neutral Criterion
a. Subjective Criteria
Disparate Impact Not Applicable
DISPARATE IMPACT APPLICABLE
b. The Control Element
Employer Must Control, Employee Cannot Have Control
Control not Determinative
2. Proving Disparate Impact
a. Causation of Impact
Printing Error, Corrected Appendix appears in the Index.
d. Bottom-Line Defense
Undercuts Impact of Criterion
IMPACT OF CRITERION NOT EXCUSED
3. Business Necessity Justification
a. Burden of Proof
EMPLOYER MUST ONLY PRODUCE EVIDENCE
Employer Must Persuade
b. Standard of Review
RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY
Mid-level Scrutiny
c. Rebuttal
EMPLOYEE MUST PERSUADE WITH EQUAL ALTERNATIVES
Employee Must Only Produce Evidence of Comparable Alternatives
*BOLD type indicates Supreme Court authority. Italicized type indicates
proposed Congressional action.
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